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THE NEGLIGENT ENABLEMENT OF TRADE
SECRET MISAPPROPRIATION
Michael L. Rustadt
INTRODUCTION
During the March 30, 2005 oral argument in the Grokster file
swapping case, the attorney representing the entertainment industry
urged the U.S. Supreme Court to brace up its test for contributory
copyright infringement in order to restrain widespread peer-to-peer
(P2P) copyright infringement. 1 The attorneys for the media moguls
urged the Court to replace the Sony standard with a more rigorous
secondary liability test that would make software providers legally
t Michael L. Rustad Ph.D., J.D., LL.M. is the Thomas F. Lambert Jr. Professor of Law
and Co-Director of the Intellectual Property Law Concentration at Suffolk University Law
School in Boston, Massachusetts. Thanks to Professor Tyler Ochoa for his invitation to present
this paper at the Conference on Third Party Liability in Intellectual Property Law held October
7, 2005 at the Santa Clara Law School. I appreciate the critical comments of Allen Hammond,
Santa Clara University School of Law, Robert Bone, Boston University School of Law and
Joseph Bauer, Notre Dame Law School. My thanks to Susan W. Brenner, the NCR
Distinguished Professor of Law & Technology, University of Dayton School of Law who
provided valuable suggestions and materials for this paper. I would like to thank John Hebb, a
working law enforcement officer, Suffolk University Law School student, and research
assistant. Shannon Downey, As'ad Hamad, Conway Kennedy, Anna-Karin Kuliga, and
Danielle Bouvier also provided expert research and editorial suggestions. Michael Scott Fischer
provided me useful examples of how software vulnerabilities are exploited in economic
espionage cases. I also appreciate the assistance given to me by Diane D'Angelo, a reference
librarian at Suffolk University Law School and the advice given to me by Andrew Beckerman-
Rodau and Jerry Cohen. Chryss J. Knowles provided useful editorial suggestions and
commentary.
1. In Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005), the
attorney for the recording industry contended that Grokster and the other file swapping services
were "built on networks of infringing users and intentionally and directly promote illegal file
swapping." Supreme Court Hears Grokster Case; Pundits Predict Narrow Decision, COMM.
DAILY, Mar. 30, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 4914200 (summarizing oral argument before
the U.S. Supreme Court in MGM v. Grokster). Twenty-eight of the world's leading media and
entertainment industry stakeholders filed suit against the owners of Morpheus, Grokster, and
KaZaA software products used by Internet users around the globe for swapping copyrighted
materials. See generally Benny Evangelista, Music File-Sharing Case Before High Court
Ruling Could Have Major Effect on Future of Entertainment Industry, Consumer Rights, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Mar. 28, 2005 at Al.
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responsible for enabling P2P copyright infringement. 2 During the
Grokster oral argument, Justice Stephen Breyer expressed skepticism
about the long-term effects of expanding secondary copyright liability
beyond the contours of the Sony case. Justice Breyer speculated that
the Xerox copying machine and the Apple iPod would never have
been brought to the marketplace if the inventors were subject to
secondary liability because their invention enabled copyright
infringement. 3
In the Ninth Circuit opinion, the appellate court applied the Sony
standard to the Streamcast and Grokster software, holding that the
providers of these peer-to-peer (P2P) products could not be
secondarily liable for copyright infringement since the software was
capable of significant lawful use. The court held that neither P2P
software developer "could be held liable, since there was no showing
that their software, being without any central server, afforded them
knowledge of specific unlawful uses."'4  In its groundbreaking
Grokster opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit,
holding that the P2P providers could be secondarily liable for
copyright infringement by importing the novel theory of intentional
inducement from patent law.
The Grokster Court unanimously held that "one who distributes
a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster
infringement is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third
parties."'5 The Court decided the case on an "intentional inducement"
theory, declining to rule on the continuing vitality of the Sony test for
contributory infringement. 6 The signpost of Grokster is the greater
willingness of the Court to approve imposing secondary liability on
third parties that facilitate intellectual property crimes and
infringement. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in MGM v.
Grokster also raises the possibility that in a future case courts may be
more receptive to arguments based upon negligent enablement, 7
2. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775. See also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
464 U.S. 417 (1984) (holding that Sony, the manufacturer of the Betamax video cassette
recorder was not liable for infringing uses of the VCR so long as the product was capable of
substantial non-infringing uses).
3. Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2792.
4. Id. at 2778.
5. Id. at 2780.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2765.
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intentional inducement's "running mate," in order to impose
secondary liability on software producers that pave the way for trade
secret misappropriation. 8
Over the past quarter century, "the American economy exploded
with new technology and a proliferation of software and Internet
companies." 9 Total revenue of the top 500 software companies for
2004 was an estimated $330.7 billion, a 14% increase from 2003.10
Software is too often introduced into the marketplace with well-
known software design defects that enable intruders to immediately
gain privileged access to computer systems, enabling the theft of trade
secrets or the leak of confidential business or personal data. 11
Substandard software costs businesses and consumers tens of billions
of dollars because of defective design features or other vulnerabilities
that enable cybercriminals. 12  This Article presents the case for
expanding third-party liability for the misappropriation of trade
secrets to safeguard American international competitiveness.
Three points are made in this article. The first point is that the
manifest function of The Economic Espionage Act (EEA) was to
punish and deter state-sponsored espionage. 13 While Congress also
intended to punish and deter the misappropriation of trade secrets by
8. I borrow this phrase from Alfred Yen who was a commentator at Santa Clara
University School of Law's Conference on Third-Party Liability in Intellectual Property Law.
9. Tanya Patterson, Heightened Securities Liability for Lawyers Who Invest in Their
Clients: Worth the Risk?, 80 TEx. L. REv. 639, 639 (2002).
10. John P. Desmond, 2004 Software 500: Growth Came in Segments,
http:l/www.softwaremag.com/L.cfm?Doc=2004-0912004-09software-500 (last visited Apr. 6,
2006).
I1. See, e.g., U.S.-CERT, UNITED STATES COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM,
NATIONAL CYBER ALERT SYSTEM, CYBER SECURITY BULLETIN, SB05-264, SUMMARY OF
SECURITY ITEMS FROM SEPTEMBER 14 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 20, 2005, http://www.us-
cert.gov/cas/bulletins/SB05-264.html.
12. Quentin Hardy, Saving Software From Itself FORBES, Mar. 14, 2005, at 60.
13. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000)) (hereinafter "EEA"). The legislative history for the EEA reveals
two reasons for the federal criminalization of trade secret theft:
(1) Foreign powers, through a variety of means, are actively involved in stealing
critical technologies, data and information from U.S. companies or the U.S.
Government for the economic benefit of their own industrial sectors. (2) Laws
then on the books-including the Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property Act
and the Mail Fraud and Fraud by Wire statutes-were of virtually no use in
prosecuting acts of economic espionage.
Gerald J. Mossinghoff, The Economic Espionage Act: A New Federal Regime of Trade Secret
Protection, available at http://www.oblon.com/Pub/mason- I 20.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
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domestic defendants, the thrust of the federal statute was directed to
espionage by foreign agents, instrumentalities, and governments.
My second point is that the EEA has played almost no role in
punishing and deterring the primary wrongdoers that misappropriate
trade secrets from foreign governments, agents, or other entities. All
but a few EEA prosecutions have been filed against domestic spies
with the federal statute playing no role in punishing and deterring
foreign agents and governments. Many of the domestic espionage
suits were cases in which the investigation was completed by the
victim corporations rather than the Justice Department or other
federal law enforcement officials.
An empirical study of all EEA prosecutions from the federal
criminal statute's enactment in 1996 to August 1, 2005 uncovered
fewer than fifty economic or espionage prosecutions filed in federal
courts; nearly every prosecution was for domestic rather than foreign
economic espionage. 14
The data on EEA defendant characteristics, targeted companies,
the nature of trade secrets stolen, the method of misappropriation, and
trends in cases prosecuted, reveals that the federal criminal statute is
not punishing and deterring state-sponsored espionage. EEA
prosecutors focus on domestic trade secret theft rather than foreign
government involvement in industrial and economic espionage.
Cybercriminals and other trade secret misappropriators are unlikely to
be deterred with such a dismal record of detection and punishment of
economic espionage by federal law enforcement officials.
My third point is that the EEA should be amended to give the
corporate victims of espionage standing to file a statutory tort action
against the primary wrongdoers as well as the software provider
whose defective software frequently paves the way for economic or
industrial espionage. Judge Jerome Frank used the term "private
attorney general" to refer to "empowering any person, official or not,
to institute a proceeding involving such a controversy, even if the sole
purpose is to vindicate the public interest. Such persons, so
14. The principal sources for the sample of EEA prosecutions include: (1) DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION (CCIPS), CURRENT
TABLE OF PROSECUTIONS FOR THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/eeapub.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006); (2) R. Mark
Halligan, Reported Criminal Arrests and Convictions Under the Economic Espionage Act of
1996, http://my.execpc.com/-mhallign/indict.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2005); (3) CURNWS
database of LEXIS/NEXIS and News file of WESTLAW; (4) ALLCASES file of
LEXIS/NEXIS and (4) Internet-related searches on the EEA.
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authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorneys General." 15 Another
court expanded this concept to include the remedy of punitive
damages where "[t]he plaintiff acts as a private attorney general to
punish the culpable wrongdoer, thereby encouraging adherence to
safety standards that benefit [society] generally .... [I]t is not the
plaintiffs individual right, but society's as a whole, that is being
defended. ' 16 The private attorney general is a litigant who files a
private cause of action for a public purpose. 17 When plaintiffs'
attorneys serve the public interest they are called "private attorneys
general." 18
Private enforcement is already well established in other branches
of intellectual property law. 19 Trade secret protection is the only
branch of intellectual property where there is not a private cause of
action based upon federal statute. 20  The Software Publishers
Association, for example, funds a private police force that actively
detects and prosecutes copyright infringement and software piracy.21
Software copyright cops routinely participate in raids on companies to
confiscate unlicensed copies of software. The industry victims of
corporate espionage are far more likely to have the resources and the
resolve to prosecute wrongdoers than federal law enforcement
personnel, who are already spread too thin in the wake of 9/11.
To maximize the private attorney general's role as an
independent monitoring force in espionage cases, the EEA must be
15. Assoc. Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943).
16. Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 661 P.2d 515, 518 (Okla. 1983); see also Kink v.
Combs, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Wis. 1965) (describing how punitive damages serve the public
because the private individual acts as a prosecutor to punish harmful conduct).
17. Thiry, 661 P.2d at 518.
18. By private attorney general, I am referring to both the litigant and plaintiff, and
plaintiffs attorney public interest role. Private attorneys general are critically needed to protect
our nation's competitiveness.
19. Michael L. Rustad, Private Enforcement of Cybercrime on the Electronic Frontier, 11
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 63, 101 (2001).
20.
Trade secrets law is one of the last areas of intellectual property that is not
covered by a federal statute granting a private right of action to trade secret
owners. Currently, federal statutes exist that provide private rights of action to
protect patents (35 U.S.C. § 281), copyrights (17 U.S.C. §§ 101-22), and
trademarks (15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129).
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Trade Secrets - The New Risks to Trade Secrets Posed by
Computerization, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 227, 233 n.34 (2002) (describing the
greater difficulty of protecting trade secrets in the networked world of computers).
21. Id.
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reconfigured to maximize private enforcement. The Economic
Espionage Act is one of the few modem regulatory statutes that do
not have a significant role for the private attorney general.22 The
revised EEA must make certain that the corporate spy is punished in
addition to being forced to disgorge all profits made from illicitly
obtained trade secrets. The EEA should be amended to permit causes
of action against third parties that enable or facilitate
misappropriation, such as vendors of software with known
vulnerabilities that did not take prompt remedial measures to reduce
the radius of the risk.23
A reformed EEA would not only give the victims of trade secret
misappropriation a private cause of action against primary
wrongdoers but also a private cause of action against software
vendors that enable or pave the way for trade secret misappropriation
because of defective software design. The expansion of secondary
liability for defective software enabling trade secret theft can teach
even the most powerful software vendor that software must be
designed for its foreseeable environment of use.
22. A large number of federal statutes have bifurcated roles for the public regulators or
law enforcement and private attorneys general: The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Bank
Holding Company Act, Consumer Credit Protection Act, Fair Housing Act, Federal National
Mortgage Association Charter Act, Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949,
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (RICO), Patent Act, Prevention of Unfair Methods of
Competition in Import Trade, Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973, Trademark Act of
1946, Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act
of 1973. Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, Crimtorts as Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 289, 326 (1998). Wealth-based civil punishment is also found in the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA), anti-insider trader statutes, and the False Claims Act. Section 1983 constitutional tort
actions, civil forfeiture litigation, securities enforcement, antitrust enforcement, sexual
harassment remedies, and whistleblower qui tam actions are just a few examples of federal
statutes employing public and private enforcement. Id. at 305.
23. Third party liability for trade secret misappropriation is generally restricted:
[T]o parties in privity with the trade secret owner who owe the owner a duty of
confidence.... The general rule regarding third party liability for trade secret
misappropriation is straightforward. One who discloses or uses another's trade
secret, without a privilege to do so, is liable to the other if... he learned the
secret from a third person with notice of the facts that it was a secret from a third
person with improper means or that the third person's disclosure of it was
otherwise a breach of duty to the other.
Steven D. Glazer, Special Issues Relating to Third Party Liability for Trade Secret
Misappropriation, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND
LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI Order No. G0-0 IIQ (Sept. 2002),
available at 719 PLIIPat 39 (Westlaw).
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At present, the injured targets of trade secret theft have no
federal civil remedy for the foreseeable consequential damages of
economic espionage. Under the tort of negligent enablement, a third-
party software vendor or other data intermediaries would only be
civilly liable in federal court if they knew or should have known of
vulnerabilities in software or network design facilitating espionage. 24
In the first decade of EEA prosecutions, no outside hacker was
prosecuted for misappropriating trade secrets by exploiting known
software defects. The new statutory tort of negligent enablement of
trade secret theft is designed to supplement lax public enforcement of
state-sponsored economic espionage. 25  Few cases of foreign
espionage have been successfully prosecuted on the criminal side of
the law because of several interrelated factors, including the problem
of anonymity, jurisdictional issues, and the lack of resources in the
law enforcement community. Economic espionage is frequently
multi-national, requiring the development of new legal sanctions
including private enforcement.
Finally, the enactment of an international convention or
extradition treaty will also be needed to reach foreign spies living on
another continent or operating in an offshore haven. The long-term
impact of federal statutory private remedies for economic and
industrial espionage will improve global competitiveness for
American industry.
I. THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT: THE LAW-IN-THE-
BOOKS
A. Economic Espionage and the American Experience
This part of the Article confirms that the Economic Espionage
Act has been a gross failure in punishing and deterring the widespread
practice of economic espionage by foreign states. Today's
24. Negligent enablement claims will not excuse a company that has not taken reasonable
efforts to protect the secrecy of an alleged trade secret. See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem.
Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 849 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Colorado law). A company's failure to
protect its trade secrets through nondisclosure agreements, restricted covenants in licenses and
other reasonable measures will preclude any misappropriation action.
25. "The EEA prosecutorial record also reveals that the Government has not brought
prosecutions when trade secrets have been disclosed unintentionally, i.e. through mere
negligence or inadvertence." Mark D. Seltzer & Angela A. Burns, Criminal Consequences of
Trade Secret Misappropriation: Does the Economic Espionage Act Insulate Trade Secrets from
Theft and Render Civil Remedies Obsolete?, 1999 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 52501,
http://www.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/law/st-org/iptf/articles/content/1999052501 .html.
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Hobbesian-like economic competition was prefigured by our
Founding Fathers' unofficial policy of condoning the wholesale theft
of technology from England and other European states according to a
provocative new historical study by Doron S. Ben-Atar. 26 When
Georgia planters stole a prototype for Eli Whitney's cotton gin and
began to disseminate that invention throughout the South, their
defense to patent infringement claims was that the cotton gin was not
patentable and had in fact been in use in England and Ireland for
decades. 27
During the Revolutionary War, America's Founding Fathers
routinely employed spies to learn about the techniques and processes
of English industry. 28 Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, and other U.S.
diplomats in Europe recruited artisans and "were also not averse to
promoting industrial espionage. ' 29 Jefferson, for example, sought to
acquire wool carding and spinning machinery built by English
artisans in France.30 Both Madison and Jefferson incorporated the
"acquisition of European technology into their larger vision of
American diplomacy."'31  In Jefferson's first State of the Union
address, he noted how he intended to jump start the U.S. economy by
the introduction of "new and useful inventions from abroad. '32
Fast forward to the twenty-first century. The world is still
divided into intellectual property "haves" and "have-nots," but the
intellectual property shoe is now on the other foot. Many developing
countries, including America's allies, use legal or illegal means to
acquire critical technologies from the United States. 33 U. S. firms
own the crown jewels of the information society whereas less
developed competitors, such as China, Taiwan, and Korea have
inexpensive raw materials and a low-wage labor force. 34
26. DORON S. BEN-ATAR, TRADE SECRETS: INTELLECTUAL PIRACY AND THE ORIGINS OF
AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL POWER (Yale University Press) (2005).
27. Id. at xiv.
28. Id. at 34.
29. Id. at 123.
30. Id. at 124.
31. Id. at 159.
32. Id. at 157.
33. Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage
(1998), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/fy98.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
34.
The smartest companies are looking far field for innovation as well.... Other
companies on FORTUNE's Global 500 list, such as Boeing and Microsoft and
Pfizer, are collaborating with engineers and scientists in India and China and
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Empirical evidence on the extent of economic espionage is
unknown and perhaps, unknowable. China, like the United States in
the eighteenth century, has a concerted policy of jump-starting its
economy through misappropriating the trade secrets of the software,
pharmaceutical, and financial services industries, as well as other
industries employing advanced information technologies. 35  The
assistant director of the FBI's counterintelligence division rates China
as the "biggest [espionage] threat to the [United States] today."'36 The
FBI estimates that 3,000 Chinese "front companies" have been set up
for the sole purpose of acquiring U.S. military or industry
technologies. 37
Chinese nationals studying in U.S. universities or working for
U.S. defense contractors "are contacted by Chinese government
officials or one of more than 3,000 Chinese front companies.., to
specifically acquire military or industrial technologies illegally. '38
Today's greatest threat may be from Far Eastern countries, but
tomorrow's trade secret thieves may be engaged in state-sponsored
Russia. Why reach out to incubate ideas? Says Forrester Research CEO George
Colony: "There's simply not enough qualified talent at home for global
companies to keep pace."
Patricia Sellers, Where do good ideas come from? For Global 500 companies, the answer could
be anyplace., FORTUNE, July 25, 2005, at 127.
35. Editorial, Chinese Cook Books, INVESTOR'S BusiNEss DAILY, June 20, 2005, at A18
(contending that 90% of China's technology is stolen from more developed countries).
36. Jay Solomon, Phantom Menace: FBI Sees Big Threat from Chinese Spies: Businesses
Wonder, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2005, at Al.
37. Wall Street Journal: FBI Sees Big Threat From Chinese Spies; Businesses Wonder,
CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, Taiwan (Aug. 10, 2005). Chinese espionage generally uses
employees or ex-employees to transmit trade secrets to Chinese government-related companies.
The FBI recently arrested two ex-employees of Metaldyne Corporation of
Plymouth, Michigan, on charges that they stole Metaldyne's trade secrets to
enable a Chinese business to produce exact replicas of products at a reduced
price.... One defendant, Fuping Liu, worked at Metaldyne as an engineer until
quitting in April 2004 to work for a competitor, while his co-defendant, Anne
Lockwood, was a former vice president of sales at Metaldyne.
The FBI documented that the defendants made multiple trips to meet with potential Chinese
business partners transmitting numerous purloined documents about the target company's
proprietary production methods. Combating Organized Piracy, Hearing Before the Subcomm.
On Oversight of Government Management, The Federal Workforce, and the District of
Columbia of the S. Committee on U.S. Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, June 14,
2005, (statement of Laura H. Parsky, Deputy Assistant Attorney General) 2005 WL 1396295
(Westlaw).
38. Wall Street Journal: FBI Sees Big Threat From Chinese Spies; Businesses Wonder,
CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY, Taiwan (Aug. 10, 2005).
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espionage originating in India, Pakistan, Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
Rumania or other less developed countries. 39
Modem China and other developing countries have a great
incentive to use illicit means to transfer advanced technologies from
the United States to jump-start their economies. Just as England lost
its competitive edge because of state-sanctioned espionage, U.S.
global hegemony is endangered by economic espionage in the twenty-
first century. The United States will be unable to maintain its
international competitiveness unless it finds some means to protect its
trade secret information. 40
Economic espionage may be broadly defined as "the unlawful or
clandestine targeting or acquisition of sensitive financial, trade, or
economic policy information; proprietary economic information; or
critical technologies. '4 1 "Economic crimes have a serious impact on
a wide variety of U.S. industries and businesses and therefore upon
the economic well-being of the [United States]. '42 At present, the
victims of trade secret theft have no federal cause of action and must
file parallel civil suits in state or federal courts in diversity actions.
Parallel civil suits in different courts not only impede successful
prosecutions by the Department of Justice but subject material
governmental and non-governmental witnesses to "searching and
protracted depositions and interrogatories even before the
Government can present testimony to a jury. '43 The next part of the
article proposes that Congress amend the EEA to provide the victims
of economic espionage with new tort remedies against primary
wrongdoers and software licensors whose defective products and
services enable trade secret theft.
B. Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA)
1. Purpose of the EEA
The EEA, signed into law by President Clinton on October 11,
1996, was enacted to punish and deter foreign and domestic spies
39. Rob Lever, Security Experts Warn of Chinese Cyberattacks for Industrial Secrets,
AFX-AsIA, July 24, 2005, at 1.
40. Kent B. Alexander & Kristen L. Wood, The Economic Espionage Act: Setting the
Stage for a New Commercial Code of Conduct, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 907, 909 (1999).
41. Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage
(2001), http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports-speeches/reports/fecie-all/FECIE_2001 .pdf.
42. Id.
43. Seltzer & Bums, supra note 25.
2006] NEGLIGENT ENABLEMENT OF TRADE SECRETS 465
threatening America's economic well-being.44 The annual losses due
to economic espionage are estimated to be between $130 billion and
$330 billion.45 "The National Counterintelligence Center and the
U.S. State Department found that seventy-four U.S. corporations
reported more than 400 incidents or suspected incidents of economic
espionage by foreign companies." 46 Until 1996, there was no federal
criminal statute punishing industrial spying by foreign governments
and agents. 47 The prosecution of trade secret theft as a criminal
offense is a fairly recent development. 48  Prior to the EEA,
prosecutors pursued the theft of trade secrets by using existing law
such as the 1934 National Stolen Property Act, which was intended to
punish thieves who also fled across state borders in automobiles. 49
44. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 (2000)). The EEA was enacted to fill a gap in the law. "Other federal
statutes, such as the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314, and the Mail and Wire
Fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 18 U.S.C. § 1343, were also of limited use in combating
the problem of economic espionage." J. Michael Chamblee, Validity, Construction, and
Application of Title I of Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 177 A.L.R. FED. 609, 617-18 (2005).
45. Richard Krantz, Industrial Espionage Becomes Favorite Way to Achieve Quick Gains,
Voice of America Broadcast, Voice Am. Press Releases & Documents, Apr. 29, 2005,
http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2005-04/2005-04-29-voal.cfm (quoting an industrial
espionage expert).
46. Information Security,
http://www.idsemergencymanagement.com/emergency-management/us/Risk-Decisions/Securit
y_RiskProtectionEspionage/29 0/g supplier_4.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
47. "Until 1996 there was no federal statute that explicitly criminalized the theft of
commercial trade secrets." United States Department of Justice Intellectual Property Manual,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ipmanual/08ipma.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006)
(discussing enforcement of the Economic Espionage Act). See also Joseph N. Hosteny, The
Economic Espionage Act: A Very Mixed Blessing,
http://www.hosteny.com/articles/espionage.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
48. "However, the misappropriating party has not normally been exposed to criminal
liability for wrongfully taking a trade secret. In the 1960's a number of states enacted statutes
making it a crime to wrongfully misappropriate a trade secret." Donald M. Zupanec, Criminal
Liability for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets, 84 A.L.R.3d 967, 971-72 (2005).
49. R. Mark Halligan noted that prior to the EEA federal prosecutors "relied primarily
upon the National Stolen Property Act and the wire and mail fraud statutes to commence
criminal prosecutions for trade secret theft." The National Stolen Property Act was enacted by
Congress in 1934 to prevent criminals from evading state prosecutions by fleeing in automobiles
across state lines with stolen property. Prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 2314 require the
government to prove that "goods, wares or merchandise" were transported in "interstate or
foreign commerce" and that the defendant knew that they were "stolen, converted or taken by
fraud." "Trade secret prosecutions under this Act have been difficult because some courts have
held that the theft of 'purely intellectual property' does not constitute the theft of 'goods, wares
or merchandise' as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2314.31." R. Mark Halligan, The Economic
Espionage Act of 1996: The Theft of Trade Secrets is Now a Federal Crime,
http://my.execpc.com/-mhallign/crime.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
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The National Stolen Property Act applied to tangible goods but was
not clearly applicable to the unauthorized transfer of intangibles such
as intellectual property. 50 Another statute, the Federal Mail Fraud
Act, required proof that economic espionage used the U.S. Postal
Service.51  Similarly, the Wire Fraud statute "requires intent to
defraud as well as the use of wire, radio or television. '52 "The only
federal statute explicitly targeting the theft of trade secrets was
limited to government employees' unauthorized disclosure of trade
secrets, and offenders were subject only to misdemeanor penalties." 53
The EEA was enacted to bridge a gap in trade secret law by creating
two new federal crimes for trade secret misappropriation:
Section 1831 covers misappropriation by foreign governments or
their agents, which is punishable by fines up to $500,000 or
imprisonment of up to fifteen years. Offending organizations may
be subject to fines of up to $10,000,000. Section 1832 covers
misappropriation that is intended to benefit individuals and
corporations. Under Section 1832, individuals are subject to fines
and up to ten years of imprisonment, while organizations are
subject to fines of up to $5,000,000. 54
In hearings that led to the passage of the 1996 Economic
Espionage Act, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh testified, "[e]conomic
espionage is the greatest threat to our national security since the Cold
War."55  He observed that "[t]he end of the Cold War sent
government spies scurrying to the private sector to perform illicit
work for businesses and corporations and by 1996 studies revealed
that nearly $24 billion of corporate intellectual property was being
stolen each year." 56 The 2002 Annual Report to Congress on Foreign
50. See, e.g., Dowling v. United States, 473 U.S. 207, 216 (1985).
51. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, J. Derek Mason & David A. Oblon, The Economic Espionage
Act: A New Federal Regime of Trade Secret Protection, http://www.oblon.com/Pub/mason-
120.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
52. Id.
53. George "Toby" Dilworth, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996: An Overview,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/usamay2001_6.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
54. KINNEY & LANGE P.A., INTELL. PROP. L. Bus. LAW § 12.11 (2005).
55. Alan Gathright & Vanessa Hua, Tech Theft Rises Amid China Ties, S.F. CHRON., Feb.
10, 2003, at Al.
56. United States. v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 194 (3rd Cir. 1998). Freeh also testified that:
[The FBI's] investigations of economic espionage cases had doubled in the
previous year from 400 to 800, and that 23 countries had been involved.
According to Freeh, foreign governments are actively targeting U.S. industry and
the U.S. government to steal critical technologies, data, and information in order
to provide their own industrial sectors with a competitive advantage.
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Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage estimated that
"economic espionage and loss of critical information cost American
companies more than $300 billion a year."157  An FBI report
concluded that "losses related to high-tech crimes in the United States
are $10 billion to $15 billion per year." 58 One observer describes
business espionage as the new battleground for global hegemony:
Since the end of the Cold War, the focus of intelligence and
counterintelligence efforts has shifted from military and political
targets to technological and economic ones. Nations have been
reshaping their intelligence agencies and investigative resources to
be more responsive to the competitive and global needs of
businesses. The Cold War has been replaced by the Economic
War. The increase in trade secret theft has placed the technologies
of U.S. companies, ranging from simple textile formulas to
complex defense technology, at great risk.59
The EEA provides criminal sanctions and civil damages for the
misappropriation of trade secrets. The Congressional purpose of the
EEA was to enhance trade secret protection:
For many years federal law has protected intellectual property
through the patent and copyright laws. With this legislation,
Congress will extend vital federal protection to another form of
proprietary economic information - trade secrets. There can be no
question that the development of proprietary economic information
is an integral part of America's economic well-being. Moreover,
the nation's economic interests are a part of its national security
interests. Thus, threats to the nation's economic interest are threats
to the nation's vital security interest.
60
Congress passed this statute against "a backdrop of increasing
threats to corporate security and a rising tide of international and
domestic economic espionage."161
Sorojini J. Biswas, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996,
http://www.myersbigel.com/tsarticles/tradesecret4.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006) (quoting
FBI Director Louis Freeh's testimony).
57. Richard B. Isaacs, How Not to Tell All: Find out How to Preserve the Company's
Competitive Edge by Preventing Proprietary Information from Being Given Away; 5 SECURITY
MGMT. 102 (May 1, 2004).
58. Tony Aeilts, Defending Against Cybercrime and Terrorism: a New Role for
Universities, 74 T-E FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 14, 15 (Jan. 1, 2005).
59. Thierry Oliver Desmet, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996: Are We Finally Taking
Corporate Spies Seriously?, 22 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 93, 96-97 (1999).
60. H.R. REP. NO. 104-788, at 4 (1996).
61. United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3dat 194.
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2. EEA Definition of Trade Secrets
The EEA draws heavily upon the common law but is broader
than the misappropriation tort.62 The federal criminal statute is based
primarily upon property concepts as opposed to wrongful conduct.63
Any tangible property and intangible information is potentially
classifiable as a trade secret so long as the owner "has taken
reasonable measures to keep such information secret, ' 64 and the
information "derives independent economic value.., from not being
generally known to ... the public. '65 The theft of trade secrets is
criminalized if the defendant: (1) stole, or without authorization of the
owner, obtained, destroyed or conveyed information; (2) knew or
believed that this information was a trade secret; and (3) the
information was in fact a trade secret.66
3. Reasonable Measures to Protect Trade Secrets
No EEA prosecution may be initiated unless "the owner thereof
has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret. '67 If
a company fails to implement reasonable computer security, the
consequence is that proprietary information is not treated as a trade
secret. 68 The U.S. Attorney General has the discretion to institute
civil enforcement actions and obtain injunctive relief for violations. 69
The EEA provides for protective orders to protect trade secrets during
litigation. 70 In addition, the court has broad powers to protect the
62. Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Problematic Role of Criminal Law in Regulating Use of
Information: The Case of the Economic Espionage Act, 80 N.C. L. REV. 853, 860 (2002).
63. Id.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(1)(3)(A) (2000). See also Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. Dev
Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179-80 (7th Cir. 1991) (discussing reasonable measures to protect
trade secrets under Illinois' Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (2000) (defining the term "trade secret" to include "all forms and
types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information,
including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes,
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and
whether or how stored, compiled or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically,
photographically, or in writing," as long as the "reasonable measures" and "independent
economic value" tests are met).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(a) (2000).
68. Weigh Sys. South, Inc. v. Mark's Scales & Equip., Inc., 68 S.W.3d 299 (Ark. 2002)
(holding that inadequate computer security resulted in the loss of trade secret protection).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2000).
70. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
SECTION (CCIPS), INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES VIII.B9,
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confidentiality of trade secrets during litigation.7 1 A trade secret does
not lose its protection under the EEA "if it is temporarily,
accidentally, or illicitly released to the public, provided it does not
become generally known or readily ascertainable through proper
means. ' 72  The modem standard is that the trade secret owner
implements reasonable standards.
Reasonable efforts to protect the secrecy of alleged trade secrets
include compliance with mandatory export control laws imposed on
the export of data and goods that implement or reveal technology.73
The EEA requires that courts take such actions as necessary to
preserve the confidentiality of the trade secret.74 The EEA also
contains a provision designed to preserve the confidentiality of trade
secrets during criminal prosecutions. Title 18 U.S.C. section 1835
states that a court:
shall enter such orders and take such other action as may be
necessary and appropriate to preserve the confidentiality of trade
secrets, consistent with the requirements of the Federal Rules of
Criminal and Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and
all other applicable laws. An interlocutory appeal by the United
States shall lie from a decision or order of a district court
authorizing or directing the disclosure of any trade secret.75
4. Value
EEA prosecutions also require proof that a trade secret has
value. If reasonable measures are not taken by the trade secret owner,
value can be destroyed. The EEA requires that the information must
derive "independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ipmanuaV08ipma.htr (last visited Apr. 5, 2006)
(discussing procedures for seeking protective order protecting trade secrets).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1835 (2000).
72. United States v. Genovese, No. 05 CR.04 (WHP), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11947, at
*9-10 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2005).
73. 1 am grateful to Jerry Cohen for pointing out that voluntary reasonable efforts are
complemented by a large number of federal statutes to protect trade secrets in government
contracts or grants. In addition, a company's reasonable methods includes private license
agreements from third parties included in the goods and services of value added resellers or
licensees.
74. 18 U.S.C. § 1835 (2000).
75. Id.
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proper means by, the public."' 76 The statute does not specify any de
minimis value in trade secrets that triggers EEA prosecutions. 77
5. Two Types of EEA Trade Secret Theft
The EEA criminalizes two types of offenses: (1) economic
espionage that benefits foreign governments or entities (Section 1831)
and (2) the theft of trade secrets that benefit any person but the true
owner (Section 1832).78 Section 1831 criminalizes the theft of trade
secrets when the defendant, intending or knowing that the offense will
benefit any foreign government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign
agent, knowingly:
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries
away, or conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade
secret; (2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches,
draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys,
photocopies, replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails,
communicates, or conveys a trade secret; (3) receives, buys, or
possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have been stolen or
appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization; (4)
attempts to commit any offense described in any of... (1) through
(3); or (5) conspires with one or more persons to commit any
offense described in any of... (1) through (3), and one or more of
such persons [does] any act to effect the object of the conspiracy. 79
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(b) (2000).
77. One of the conceptual difficulties in trade secret law is the degree to which value and
reasonable measures form a circular system.
78. Section 1832 was enacted as part of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-294, 110 Stat. 3488.
In relevant part, the statute applies to anyone who, with intent to convert a trade
secret, that is related to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in
interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of anyone other than the
owner thereof, and intending or knowing that the offense will, injure any owner
of that trade secret, knowingly ... without authorization copies, duplicates,
sketches, draws, photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies,
replicates, transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys such
information.
United States v. Genovese, No. 05 CR.04 (WHP), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11947, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2005). "The first offense, 'economic espionage,' arises only when the theft
benefits a foreign government. This carries higher penalties than the second offense, 'theft of
trade secrets,' which is more sweeping, and concerns theft benefiting any person but the true
owner." Sylvia N. Albert, Jason A. Sanders & Jessica M. Mazzaro, Twentieth Survey of White
Collar Crime: Intellectual Property Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 631, 634 (2005).
79. 17 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000).
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In contrast, Section 1832 applies to domestic trade secret theft.
Section 1832 is a broader provision applying "to anyone who
knowingly engages in the theft of trade secrets, or an attempt or
conspiracy to do so."180 The vast majority of prosecutions were filed
under Section 1832, which classifies "attempt" and "conspiracy" as
distinct offenses from those acts that constitute completed crimes
under the statute.81
A large number of EEA prosecutions have been for attempt or
conspiracy to steal trade secrets. 82 The government has used Section
1832 rather than 1831, even when the defendant is a foreign national
or representing a foreign entity, because of the difficulty of proving
the involvement of a foreign government or entity beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Section 1832, sanctioning the "theft of trade secrets," is of more
general application than Section 1831, but nonetheless includes
several limitations not found in Section 1831:
The three prosecutorial limitations not present in the "economic
espionage" offense: (i) the intended benefit realized must be
economic in nature; (ii) the thief must intend or know that the
offense will injure the rightful owner; and (iii) the stolen
information must be related to or included in a product produced
for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce.83
The government's burden under Section 1831 is proof beyond a
reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant stole, or without the owner's
authorization obtained, destroyed, or conveyed information; (2) the
defendant knew or believed that this information was a trade secret;
(3) the information was a trade secret; and (4) the defendant intended
or knew that the offense would benefit a foreign government,
instrumentality, or agent. 84 Section 1831 was "designed to apply only
80. United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d at 195.
81. "It has been held that to establish that a defendant is guilty of conspiracy under 18
U.S.C. § 1832(a)(5), the prosecution must prove that an agreement existed, that it had an
unlawful purpose, and that the defendant was a voluntary participant." J. Michael Chamblee,
Validity, Construction and Application of Title I of Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 177
A.L.R. Fed. 609, 625 (2005)
82. See, e.g., Hsu, 155 F.3d at 197 (noting that the EEA "defendants are charged only with
attempting to steal, and conspiring to steal, trade secrets under § 1832.").
83. Sylvia N. Albert, Jason A. Sanders & Jessica M. Mazzaro, Twentieth Survey of White
Collar Crime: Intellectual Property Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 631, 636 (2005).
84. The term "foreign instrumentality" means "any agency, bureau, component,
institution, association, or any legal, commercial, or business organization, firm, or entity that is
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when there is 'evidence of foreign government sponsored or
coordinated intelligence activity.' 85
6. Criminal Penalties Under the EEA
Under the foreign section of the EEA, a violator is subject to a
fifteen-year prison term and a $500,000 fine.86 The domestic trade
secret theft section subjects violators to a ten-year prison term and a
$250,000 fine. Organizations found guilty under the EEA can be
fined up to $10 million for foreign espionage or $5 million for trade
secret theft. 87 The EEA criminalizes the knowing theft of trade
secrets, as well as attempts and conspiracies to steal trade secrets. 88
The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Yang,89 held that legal
impossibility was not a defense to a charge of attempt and conspiracy
to steal a trade secret under the EEA's domestic trade secret section. 90
The EEA statute also provides for the criminal forfeiture of any
property or proceeds derived from a violation of the statute.91
substantially owned, controlled, sponsored, commanded, managed, or dominated by a foreign
government." 18 U.S.C. § 1839(1) (2000).
85. Hsu, 155 F.3dat 195.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2000).
87. Id; 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000).
88. EEA prosecutions have been based on the misappropriation of, or on attempts or
conspiracies to misappropriate, various types of trade secrets including: proprietary corporate
documents (as has been alleged in the case with Branch and Erskine); technical reports (United
States v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1170 (2003)); documents
reflecting the processes, methods and formulas for manufacturing the drug Taxol (Hsu, 155 F.3d
at 191-92); computer data detailing the specifications for aircraft replacement parts (United
States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263, 264-65 (7th Cir. 2002)); proprietary pricing information (United
States v. Morris, No. 02-CR-120 (D. Del.)); and proprietary customer information. (United
States v. Chang, No. 00-CR-20203 (N.D. Calif)). David W. Simon, Prosecution of IP Theft
Increases, Nat'L L.J., Aug. 11,2003, at 15.
Section 1831, "economic espionage," requires that the theft of trade secrets
benefit a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent in some manner. This
type of misappropriation of trade secrets not only covers outright theft or
unauthorized duplication, but also includes trafficking in stolen trade secrets, as
well as the attempt and conspiracy to commit these offenses. Section 1831
includes an intent component requiring that the misappropriation be "knowingly"
committed.
Albert, Sanders & Mazzaro, supra note 83, at 636.
89. Yang, 281 F.3d at 534; See also Hsu, 155 F.3d at 200 (holding that "Congress did not
intend to allow legal impossibility to be asserted as a defense to attempt" EEA offenses).
90. 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2000).
91. 18 U.S.C. § 1834 (2000).
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7. Extraterritorial Reach of the EEA
The EEA has an expansive jurisdictional reach to punish and
deter the theft of domestic trade secrets and "economic espionage that
occurs overseas, so long as federal law binds the offender or an 'act in
furtherance of the offense was committed in the United States."' 92
Section 1837 of the EEA imposes criminal fines on a foreign
corporation that sells a product within the United States.93 The
EEA's long arm reaches U.S. citizens and corporations "for actions
occurring abroad, even when there is no other connection with the
United States."'94 Prosecutors may pursue trade secret thieves outside
the country "so long as some part of the activity is connected to the
United States."'95
II: THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT: THE LAW-IN-ACTION
The future of American society depends upon our ability to
compete in the global economy. "The conquest of markets and
technologies has replaced former territorial and colonial conquests.
We are living in a state of world economic war and this is not just a
military metaphor... the companies are training the armies and the
unemployed are the casualties. '96
The underpinning of American competitiveness in the worldwide
economy depends upon shielding U.S. trade secrets. The 1998
Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Collection and Industrial
Espionage reported $44 billion in losses from a survey of Fortune
1,000 companies and the 300 fastest growing U.S. companies.97 The
explanation for the astonishing rise in economic espionage and its
colossal cost to business is simple: "mountainous accumulations of
tempting trade secrets that constitute to vast intellectual property
achievements of U.S. companies." 98  One of the foremost security
92. Albert, Sanders & Mazzaro, supra note 83, at 637.
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1837 (2000).
94. Albert, Sanders & Mazzaro, supra note 83, at 637.
95. Id.
96. Bernard Esambert, President of the French Pasteur Institute, Paris Conference on
Economic Espionage, quoted by IWS Cybercrime and Economic Espionage,
http://www.iwar.org.uk/ecoespionage/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
97. "Despite an overall 12-percent response rate, responding companies reported $44
billion in known and suspected losses over a 17-month period during 1996-97." Annual Report,
supra note 33.
98. STEVEN FINK, STICKY FINGERS: MANAGING THE GLOB3AL RISK OF ECONOMIC
ESPIONAGE 7 (Dearborn Trade) (2002).
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threats is the capacity of foreign spies to steal crucial confidential
information.
The next part of the article presents findings from an empirical
study that describes what the first decade of EEA prosecutions tell us
about the federal criminalization of trade secret protection.
A. FINDING #1. THE CASES TELL US THAT THE EEA IS
ADDRESSING GNATS, NOT CAMELS.
For years now, there has been mounting evidence that many
foreign nations and their corporations have been seeking to gain
competitive advantage by stealing the trade secrets, the intangible
intellectual property of inventors in this country. The Intelligence
Committee has been aware that since the end of the Cold War,
foreign nations have increasingly put their espionage resources to
work trying to steal American economic secrets. Estimates of the
loss to U.S. business from the theft of intangible intellectual
property exceed $100 billion. The loss in U.S. jobs is
incalculable. 9 9
The EEA is not effectively punishing and deterring economic
and industrial espionage. Table One reveals that less than fifty
prosecutions have been pursued under the EEA since its enactment in
1996.100 Forty-seven percent of the EEA prosecutions were filed in
2001 or 2002 (twenty-three out of forty-eight). In the period 2003-
2005, the number of EEA prosecutions has dropped precipitously. 101
As of August 1, 2005, only one EEA prosecution has been filed, a
case in which a former officer of a Michigan-based automobile parts
manufacturer and another ex-employee were charged with being part
of a conspiracy to sell trade secrets belonging to two Michigan
99. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Legislative History - Economic Espionage Act of 1996,
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/EEAleghist.htm (last visited Apr. 6,
2006) (quoting Sen. Arlen Specter, R-PA) (hereinafter Legislative History).
100. "As of 2002, 92 EEA cases had been referred for prosecution. Compare this with the
210 referrals for copyright offenses and the 103 referrals for trademark crimes during the same
period. And copyright and trademark cases were more likely actually to be prosecuted." Susan
W. Brenner & Anthony C. Crescenzi, State-Sponsored Crime: The Futility of the Economic
Espionage Act, at 73 n.161 (internal citations omitted) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
101. The Wall Street Journal recently reported that the "government is currently
prosecuting about a dozen cases against individuals alleged to have sent technology, sometimes
designs, sometimes software, sometimes high-tech equipment, in China illegally. FBI officials
say at least three more cases will likely go ahead in the coming months." Solomon, supra note
36. It is unclear at this time whether these cases will result in prosecutions.
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automobile parts manufacturers to a Chinese company. 102  The
Chinese firm sought the trade secrets "in an effort to undercut the
price the [Michigan] supplier charges for a sophisticated metal rod
used in truck engines."' 103
102. FBI Arrests Industrial Spies, INDUS. MAIN. & PLANT OPERATION, Mar. 1, 2005, at 6
(reporting a Detroit News story in which a Michigan company's trade secrets about "profitable
powdered-metal connecting rods used in truck engines was alleged to be used by Chongqing
Huafa Industry Co. to undercut Metaldyne's prices").
103. David Shepardson & Brett Clanton, FBI: Local Execs Stole Secrets for Chinese,
DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 2, 2005, at IA, reprinted in 2005 WLNR 1494752.
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In addition to the low overall quantity of EEA prosecutions, the
fraction of cases filed against foreign governments or their agents
under Section 1831 is negligible (see Table Two below). This
empirical fact, seen in the light of Congress's purpose in enacting the
EEA, shows how far the statutory apple has fallen from the legislative
tree.
"When Congress was considering the Economic Espionage Act,
Louis Freeh, then director of the FBI, testified that foreign
governments 'actively target U.S. persons, firms, industries, and the
U.S. government itself' to steal trade secrets, endangering the U.S.
economy and national security."' 104 There are justifiable reasons why
few cases may be brought. The U.S. government may be detecting
foreign spying but unwilling to disclose its counterspy methods,
which would occur in an EEA investigation. Another reason for few
cases is that U.S. intelligence agencies are seeking the same trade
secret from other countries as other countries are seeking from us-
104. Daniel Sorid, Economic-Spying Case May Signal Crackdown, CHICAGO TRIBUNE,
Nov. 23, 2003, at CI.
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hence, they may want to avoid retaliatory legal actions against U.S.
companies in foreign countries. 10 5
Since 1996, only two of the forty-eight espionage cases have
been prosecuted under the foreign espionage section of the EEA since
1996.106 It is unlikely that law enforcement will receive international
cooperation because of the very nature of state-sponsored espionage.
Foreign governments simply do not have the incentive to prosecute or
even extradite companies or individuals that misappropriate the trade
secrets of U.S. companies. In general, the United States receives very
little cooperation from our allies in prosecuting foreign spies. 107
Further, prosecution of state-sponsored espionage by allies is
improbable during a period in which the United States needs backing
in the war against terrorism. 108
The first U.S. indictment under the foreign espionage section of
the EEA charged two Japanese researchers with the larceny of
confidential medical information from a research institute of the
Cleveland Clinic Foundation on behalf of The Institute of Physical
and Chemical Research (Riken), a Japanese company. The only other
foreign espionage case arose out of a massive Chinese scheme to steal
trade secrets in a number of Silicon Valley computer companies. In
United States v. Ye, the defendants were indicted for trade secret theft,
conspiracy, and foreign transportation of stolen property. 109
The charges arose out of a conspiracy to steal trade secrets from
four Silicon Valley companies for the People's Republic of China
(PRC), although the PRC was not named in the criminal complaint. 110
The trade secrets were stolen from four high-tech companies in
Silicon Valley: Transmeta Corporation (Transmeta), Sun
105. Andy Beckerman-Rodau suggested these alternative hypotheses for the failure of the
EEA in actions against foreign agents, entities, or governments.
106. Albert, Sanders & Mazzaro, supra note 83, at 637 (discussing Section 1832 EEA
prosecutions).
107. See Brenner & Crescenzi, supra note 100 (citing example of French school that
basically trains experts in economic espionage).
108. I am indebted to Susan Brenner for her point that prosecutors may be reluctant to
name foreign governments as accomplices in EEA crimes because it will raise serious foreign
policy or diplomacy issues.
109. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Pair from Cupertino and San Jose, California,
Indicted for Economic Espionage and Theft of Trade Secrets From Silicon Valley Companies
(Dec. 4, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/yelndict.htm.
110. Id.
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Microsystems, Inc. (Sun), NEC Electronics Corporation (NEC), and
Trident Microsystems, Inc. (Trident).11'
Both defendants were employees of Transmeta and one co-
defendant also worked at Sun and NEC. The purpose of the
espionage in Ye was to lend a hand to China whose goal was to
develop a super-integrated circuit design "and form a powerful
capability to compete with worldwide leaders' core development
technology and products in the field of integrated circuit design." 112
Federal prosecutors were hesitant to file Section 1831 charges against
the Chinese government, preferring to file a complaint under Section
1832, the domestic espionage section of the EEA.
The first decade of EEA cases demonstrates the ineffectiveness
of law enforcement in stemming the tide of economic espionage. In
general, EEA prosecutions are filed in cases where avaricious
individuals have misappropriated trade secrets from their employer.
Few of the prosecutions were against sophisticated state actors
infiltrating U.S. companies or hacking into computer systems. In
general, state-sponsored espionage is carried out with impunity with a
trivial chance of being detected let alone prosecuted under the
EEA. 113 While the EEA defendant class is highly educated, a few of
the schemes to steal trade secrets are based upon blind stupidity
coupled with cupidity. 114 In United States v. Martin, the hapless
defendant was caught when she inadvertently transmitted a smoking-
gun e-mail containing purloined trade secrets to a manager in the
111. Id.
112. Id.
113.
On December 7, 1996, the first arrest under the EEA was made in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. Patrick Worthing and his brother, Daniel, were arrested by FBI
agents after agreeing to sell Pittsburgh Plate Glass ("PPG") proprietary
information for $1,000 to a FBI undercover agent posing as a representative of
Owens-Coming. The Government alleged that Worthing solicited Owens-
Coming's CEO under an assumed name in a letter that stated: "Would it be of
any profit to Owens-Coming to have the inside track on PPG?"
Mark D. Seltzer & Angela A. Bums, Criminal Consequences of Trade Secret Misappropriation:
Does the Economic Espionage Act Insulate Trade Secrets from Theft and Render Civil Remedies
Obsolete, 1999 B.C. INTELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 052501 (discussing United States v. Worthing,
Crim. No. 97-9 (W.D. Pa, Crim. Complaint filed Dec. 9, 1996)),
http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/law/st-org/iptf/articles/content/1999052501 .html; see also
United States v. Davis, Crim. No. 97-CR-124 (M.D. Tenn. 1997), Id. (discussing case in which
a contractor for Gillette contacted Schick, Wilkinson and Bic offering to sell information about
Gillette's new shaving system).
114. This pattern is not confined to EEA arrests and prosecutions. Most criminals are
caught because they are either stupid or they do stupid things.
2006] NEGLIGENT ENABLEMENT OF TRADE SECRETS 479
targeted corporation. 1 5 In United States v. Hsu, the would-be spy
was caught when he approached an undercover FBI agent mistakenly
believing he was a technological information broker."16 All but a
small number of the EEA prosecutions grew out of poorly thought-out
schemes to steal and attempt to sell this stolen information on the
open market or to competitors. The criminal prosecutions described
in Table One and Table Two are overwhelmingly routine domestic
trade secret misappropriations rather than theft by foreign
governments and their agents. By focusing on run-of-the-mill
domestic espionage and side-stepping far more injurious foreign
espionage, the EEA is straining at gnats and swallowing camels.
B. FINDING #2: THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL BARRIERS TO
IMPLEMENTING THE CURRENT REGIME
While the EEA law-in-the-books may be reasonable, the EEA
law-in-action has been not easy to implement in practice. One reason
is that criminal law enforcement inevitably lags behind rapidly
developing technologies. Spyware, for example, is an increasing
security threat ranked by the business community ahead of spam,
hackers, and cyberterrorism. Corporate spies routinely use diagnostic
tools to intercept their competitors' messages. 117 None of these
activities have yet been the subject of an EEA prosecution.
Another stumbling block resulting in a low number of EEA
prosecutions is the reluctance of federal law enforcers to assign a high
priority to economic-based crimes. In the first months after the EEA
was enacted, the FBI filed no cases, although they investigated
approximately 800 incidents of possible economic espionage. 118 In
addition, federal law enforcement officers have given a higher priority
to enforcing federal criminal penalties for copyright and trademark
infringement than trade secret theft. 1'9
115. United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000).
116. United States v. Hsu, 982 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
117. "Forbes said about a dozen versions of Myfip may have been in circulation and used
to steal sensitive documents including mechanical designs and circuit board layouts." Rob
Lever, U.S.-Sino Cyber War, GEELONG ADVERTISER, July 27, 2005, at 21.
118. Mossinghoff, Mason & Oblon, supra note 51.
119. The federal government has made trademark and copyright infringement a priority.
"'Operation Buccaneer,' a collaborative effort by the U.S. Customs Service and the Department
of Justice . . , and the 'Joint Anti-Piracy Initiative' which, additionally, involves the FBI, is
evidence of the government's ongoing commitment to prosecute intellectual property crimes."
Albert, Sanders & Mazzaro, supra note 83, at 633.
480 SANTA CL.ARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. .. [Vol. 22
These barriers to effective statutory enforcement are explored
below, along with other problems such as lack of cooperation by
espionage victims, jurisdictional issues, and the special difficulties of
tackling foreign governments and their instrumentalities.
1. Previously Targeted Companies Fear Revictimization
The chief obstacleto EEA prosecutions is the self-inflicted
wound of cover-ups by corporate victims or the refusal to report trade
secret theft to federal law enforcement agencies. 120 Corporations
often fear the adverse publicity that accompanies punitive damages
and other forms of civil punishment far more than the monetary
costs. 121 Companies victimized by defective software will not report
these crimes because they are concerned about the loss of public
confidence in their products or services. Many companies victimized
by industrial or economic espionage do not file complaints with
federal law enforcement authorities because they may be revictimized
by adverse publicity, lower stock prices, 122 and waning public
confidence. 123
Customers and business partners will think twice about sharing
trade secrets with a trading partner or joint venturer that has
inadequate computer security to prevent computer hacking or the theft
of confidential information. Once the Department of Justice enters
into a case, the corporate victim is no longer in control of the
investigation. A company may incur costs by opening up its internal
records to federal law enforcement. Since the EEA has no private
120. 1 am indebted to Susan Brenner for suggesting that the risk of revictimization is a real
deterrent against reporting economic espionage and could be greatly reduced by reforming the
discovery provisions of the EEA.
121. Andrea A. Curcio, Painful Publicity - An Alternative Punitive Damage Sanction, 45
DEPAUL L. REV. 341, 361-62 (1996).
122. See generally Chris Carr & Larry Gorman, The Revictimization of Companies by the
Stock Market Who Report Trade Secret Theft Under the Economic Espionage Act, 57 BUS.
LAW. 25, 29 (2001) (documenting that companies suffer from declining stock prices after
reporting an EEA offense).
123.
Perhaps the biggest adjustment business executives will have to make concerns
the shift of power from the victimized business to the prosecutor. In all criminal
prosecutions the prosecutor-not the victim-is in control. Consequently, victim
businesses will lack the power to direct the prosecution, engage in negotiations,
or even dismiss the case.
J. Derek Mason, Gerald J. Mossinghoff & David A. Oblon, The Economic Espionage Act:
Federal Protection for Corporate Trade Secrets,
http://www.oblon.com/Pub/economicespionageactll.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
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cause of action, the corporate victim will be unable to recoup any of
their losses. Companies will often find the cost of cooperating with
law enforcement to far outweigh any potential gain.
2. Lack of Federal Law Enforcement Resources
Law enforcement agencies are far less prepared to address
sophisticated espionage by foreign governments than other law
enforcement priorities. While industrial espionage has always been a
part of the American experience, economic espionage in the age of
information poses a greater menace because of the greater
vulnerability of trade secrets in a networked world where a
company's crown jewels may be transported around the world at the
click of the mouse. In addition, many schemes to steal trade secrets
go undetected and unprosecuted because these crimes are difficult to
trace because of the greater anonymity possible by computer hackers.
Crime on the streets receives greater consideration than
corporate crime hatched in the suites. More successful enforcement
of the EEA requires federal law enforcement officers who have a
highly developed command of computer-based technologies and the
computer expertise to track foreign spies in the cross-border
environment of the Internet. 124 Another difficulty is that there are far
too few federal law enforcement officers with proficiency in
computer crime or cybercrime investigations, and these officers have
to deal with many other serious crimes as well. 125 Cybercrime
prosecutors also face enormous logistical and operational difficulties.
"The ability to track criminals in multiple jurisdictions, as well as
specialized knowledge of vast varieties of hardware, software,
applications, foreign languages, and other related issues, requires
regional, state, and national multiagency cooperation." 126 Fear of
violating laws against racial profiling in the federal law enforcement
community may be another barrier. 127
124. See, e.g., Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 20, at 234 (describing the greater difficulty of
protecting trade secrets in the networked world of computers).
125. Susan Brenner was the first to make this point.
126. Tony Aeilts, Defending Against Cybercrime and Terrorism: a New Role for
Universities, THE FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN, Jan. 2005, at 14.
127. The Wall Street Journal reported that Asian-Americans in Silicon Valley are
concerned about FBI overreaching with a "new wave of racial profiling... reminiscent of the
2000 case of Wen Ho Lee, a Taiwan-bom American scientist who was fired from his job at Los
Alamos National Laboratory and was prosecuted for allegedly giving away nuclear secrets to
Beijing." Solomon, supra note 36. It is unclear at this time whether these cases will result in
prosecutions.
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Economic and industrial espionage is difficult to detect without
elaborate sting operations because many of these white-collar crimes
produce no traditional crime scene. Online spies, current employees,
or ex-employees leave few of the digital footprints that DNA
evidence, fingerprints, or other personally identifiable information
used to catch most criminals leave behind. Digital trade secrets may
be copied within seconds and are easier to transport than containers of
proprietary documents.
Electronic trade secret thieves that commit financial crimes also
leave fewer clues than white-collar criminals who alter checks or
intercept promissory notes. The use of false e-mail headers, offshore
sites, and anonymous e-mailers also make catching foreign spies more
difficult. In a cybertheft case, for example, an information security
expert might need to reconstruct e-mails or other electronic smoking
guns that document attempted or completed misappropriations of
trade secrets.
The FBI and other federal enforcers have taken a reactive rather
than proactive approach. 128 To date, federal law enforcement has
been ineffective in deterring the spread of spyware used to steal data
or launch "zombie attacks" on corporate computers. 129 Spyware or
system monitors are used to steal trade secrets by running in the
background, recording what is typed in a keyboard, and sending that
information to another location. 130
In most investigations, the targeted companies hire private
investigators after receiving competitive intelligence about attempts
to misappropriate their trade secrets. 131 In order to effectively act
against misappropriators, the targeted company must have the
resources to conduct their own private investigations before
128. Susan W. Brenner and Anthony C. Crescenzi argue that a paradigm shift from reactive
to proactive law enforcement is necessary to prevent espionage. See Brenner & Crescenzi, supra
note 100, at 55.
129. A computer that has been hijacked by a backdoor Trojan is known as a zombie.
Sophos estimates that "as much as 40% of spain is being sent from zombie computers without
the user's knowledge." Looking at.. Spyware, SOPHOS NEWS, (Sophos Inc., Lynnfield, M.A.),
Nov. 2004, at 3.
130. Id.
131. Andy Beckerman-Rodau reminded me that private policing is not limited to trade
secret investigations. The private investigator is also used to investigate trademark
infringement, counterfeit goods, gray goods importation and related unfair competition. It is
arguable that in such cases that it is the initial responsibility of the property owner to protect his
or her property and after all intellectual property is a species of property.
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contacting federal law enforcement authorities. 132 Hardly any cases
of industrial spying have therefore been pursued even if
overwhelming evidence of espionage was collected by the corporate
victim and supplied to law enforcement.133
Another obstruction to successful prosecutions against foreign
governments is the requirement that the U.S. Department of Justice
receive prior approval from the U.S. Attorney General prior to filing
Section 1831 actions. The Department of Justice has inserted "a
requirement in the U.S. Attorney's Manual that prosecutions continue
to be approved and strictly supervised by the Executive Office of the
United States Attorney."'134 The U.S. Attorney General or other high-
level Deputy or Assistant Attorneys General in the Criminal Division
supervise prosecutions.135 Few cases are filed because of the fear that
a given EEA prosecution against a state actor or their affiliated agents
may precipitate a foreign policy crisis.
3. Displacement of EEA Cases by Other Priorities
Federal law enforcement needs more technical and human
resources to detect foreign governments spying on U.S. industries.
Federal law enforcement officers are less likely to devote substantial
human and economic capital to pursuing state-sponsored espionage
because of the greater priority of international terrorism. After 9/11,
the number of EEA prosecutions has fallen off significantly. An
expert in information security observes:
Law enforcement is stretched too thin fighting terrorism, and the
bad guys... see that it's open season on U.S. businesses. They
can come in and just cherry pick the trade secrets they want. 136
132. Joseph N. Hosteny, The Economic Espionage Act: A Very Mixed Blessing,
http://www.hosteny.com/articles/espionage.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
133.
Thus, to make out an offense under the economic espionage section, the
prosecution must show in each instance that the perpetrator intended to or knew
that his or her actions would aid a foreign government, instrumentality, or agent.
Enforcement agencies should administer this section with its principle purpose in
mind and therefore should not apply section 1831 to foreign corporations when
there is no evidence of foreign government sponsored or coordinated intelligence
activity.
Legislative History, supra note 99.
134. Id.
135. Mossinghoff, Mason & Oblon, supra note 51.
136. Gathright & Hua, supra note 55.
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Economic espionage prosecutions are often displaced by other
law enforcement priorities, which fluctuate between offices:
In Chicago, where I live, gang prosecutions have become a high
priority. Prosecutions involving narcotics and other controlled
substances are also important, and consume a large proportion of
the resources of any United States Attorney. Chicago is famous
too for the many prosecutions of public officials, including a
former governor, state representatives, and many judges in the
Circuit Court of Cook County, law enforcement officers, aldermen,
and many others. 137
4. Limits to Extraterritorial Reach of EEA
The EEA protects against theft that occurs either (1) in the
United States, or (2) outside the United States and (3) an act in
furtherance of the offense was committed in the United States, or (4)
if the violator is a US person or organization. 138 Extradition has
proven to be an obstacle in economic espionage cases. The Tokyo
High Court rejected the U.S. request that a Japanese scientist be
extradited to the United States to face charges of economic
espionage. 139 The Japanese scientist was charged with the pilfering
of genetic materials related to Alzheimer's disease conducted at the
Cleveland Clinic Foundation. 140 The Japanese court held that the
scientist had no probable cause to benefit his new employer, which
was an institute funded by the Japanese government. 14 1 A new treaty
or convention requiring countries to extradite trade secret thieves is
thus necessary.
137. Hosteny, supra note 132.
138. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Investigative Programs: Counterintelligence
Division, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/ci/economic.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
139. Tetsuya Morimoto, First Japanese Denial of U.S. Extradition Request: Economic
Espionage Case, 20 INT'L ENF. L. RPTR. 288 (2004).
140. Id. at 289.
141. Id at 290.
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5. Additional Difficulties in Prosecuting Foreign
Governments and Agents
Table Two
Foreign Government Prosecutions
Economic Espionage Act, Section 1832
Foreign Govt.
4.2%
95.8%
N=48
1996-Aug. 1, 2005
Table Two confirms that the EEA has proven an unproductive
tool in the war against state-sponsored espionage. Criminal activity
involving foreign governments is almost never prosecuted even
though the chief statutory purpose of the EEA is to punish spying by
foreign nations, agents, and their closely connected corporate entities.
From 1996 to 2005, U.S. prosecutors implicated foreign governments
or agents in only two EEA prosecutions. Federal prosecutors rarely
charge foreign governments or agents with crimes, even though there
is overwhelming evidence of widespread state sponsored economic
espionage.
Under the same period, thirty-three out of the forty-eight
defendants charged with economic espionage were Americans. One
in four EEA defendants were foreign nationals from countries of the
Far East: Peoples Republic of China (N=5), Taiwan (N=4), Malaysia
(N=2), and Japan (N=1). In many of these cases, the corporate spy
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was affiliated with a foreign company closely connected to a foreign
government. Yet, the U.S. government has declined to charge foreign
governments or entities, choosing to try each case under EEA's
domestic trade secret section.
It is often difficult to discover the identity of foreign spies, who
frequently operate in countries that fund their activities. Economic
and industrial espionage on the Internet crosses national borders,
creating the need for international cooperation in law enforcement.
"Protecting trade secrets after they've been posted online is a bit like
locking the barn door after the horse is stolen."'1 42 The intellectual
property "have nots" have little motivation to protect the intellectual
property rights of U.S. companies.
Federal prosecutors have been reluctant to prosecute foreign
governments, agents, or entities for economic or industrial espionage
because prosecutions may have foreign policy implications. A
possible explanation is that overburdened federal prosecutors fear
foreign policy repercussions from naming other governments in
criminal complaints.
Another hypothesis is that the U.S. Attorney General overrides
the filing of criminal charges against foreign governments, closely
connected corporate entities, or agents. One of the difficulties facing
the law enforcement community is also the lack of know-how in
information technologies necessary to detect espionage. U.S.
intelligence agencies may be more effective in dealing with foreign
trade secret theft cases than are criminal agencies like the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
Even when prosecutors have adequate technical and scientific
expertise to trail a devious foreign spy, they may be impeded by the
warrant requirements, cross-border jurisdictional concerns and the
possibility that a foreign arrest will precipitate a diplomatic crisis.
Federal prosecutors are likely to fear the foreign policy repercussions
that will be inevitable when naming a foreign government,
instrumentality, or agent in a criminal complaint assuming that
approval is granted by the U.S. Attorney General's Office.
C. FINDING #3: BIOMEDICAL, SOFTWARE AND HIGH
TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES ARE THE PRIME
142. Mark D. Rasch, Can You Keep A Secret? As the Apple Case Demonstrates, the
Internet Makes Trade Secret Protection a Challenge, IP LAW & BUSINESS, May 2005, at 24.
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TARGETS OF ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL
ESPIONAGE.
Table Three
1. High Technology as Target of Trade Secret Espionage
Industry of Target of Espionage
Economic Espionage Act Prosecutions
Softw are or Computer48% 35.4%
All Other
Biotech, Mvedicine or
Financial Services125
6.3%
N=48
1996-Aug. 2005
Table Three confirms that targets in most cases of economic
espionage and other collection activities are the computer software,
biotechnology and medical industries. However, traditional
manufacturing, defense and aerospace, telecommunications, engine
technologies, manufacturing processes, and media have also been
targets. Source code, software, or other computer-related proprietary
information was purloined in nineteen out of forty-eight cases
(40%).143 Project information, pricing information, or research on
products or processes was stolen in 19% of the EEA prosecutions
(N=9). Customer and business information was taken in 15% of the
cases leading to prosecutions (N=7). Engineering or schematic
drawings of products were the target of 10% of EEA cases (N=5).
Biogenetic materials (N=2), drug delivery systems (N=2), and
143. ROGER MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.09[5][b] (2005) (stating that the
"single most important 'product' eligible for trade secret protection is computer software.").
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competitor's business plans (N=2), access card or control information
thefts accounted for the remaining cases. This empirical finding
suggests that small or medium-sized companies simply do not have
the resources to do the groundwork necessary to gather evidence
needed by prosecutors.
2. Software or Computer Industry
Several of the most publicized foreign espionage cases were
filed against perpetrators stealing computer chip design and source
code from Silicon Valley companies. 144  In United States v.
Genovese,145 the defendant was found to be responsible for his
unauthorized Internet sale of the source code for the computer
programs Microsoft Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000, software
that had been stolen by third parties. 146 In that case, "portions of
Microsoft Corporation's source code for two of its computer
operating systems, Windows NT 4.0 and Windows 2000, appeared on
the Internet."' 147 Microsoft hired a private online security firm that
downloaded the purloined code after transferring twenty dollars to the
defendant through an online payment service. 148 After the defendant
provided access to the source code through his FTP server, Microsoft
alerted the FBI. 149  An undercover FBI agent then contacted
Genovese and purchased the Microsoft source code. 150 The sting
operation resulted in the arrest of the defendant for unlawfully
downloading and selling a trade secret. 151  In another stolen
computer-related technology case, two defendants placed an Internet
144. John R. Wilke, Two Silicon Valley Cases Raises Fears of Chinese Espionage, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 15, 2003, at A4, available at http://www.economicespionage.com/WSJ.htm (last
visited Apr. 5, 2006); See, e.g., Press Release, United States Department of Justice, San Jose
Man Indicted for Theft of Trade Secrets and Computer Fraud (Apr. 2, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/murphylndict.htm (reporting arrest of San Jose
defendant for stealing his employer's chip features, and wireless computer networks
specifications).
145. Press Release, United States Department of Justice, U.S. Arrests Connecticut Man on
Charge of Selling Stolen Microsoft Windows Source Code (Nov. 9, 2004),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/genoveseCharge.htm.
146. United States v. Genovese, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11947 (S.D.N.Y., June 21, 2005).
147. "Genovese posted a message on his Website offering the code for sale: "win2000
source code jacked ... and illmob.org got a copy of it... im [sic] sure if you look hard you can
find it or if you wanna buy it ill give you a password to my ftp." Id. at * 1.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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advertisement offering stolen prototype Intel Central Processing Units
(CPU) for "Slot II" computers. 152  The victims of software or
computer-related trade secret theft in the EEA database included well-
known companies such as C & D Semiconductor Services, Cisco,
IBM, Intel, Jasmine Networks, Lucent Technologies, Sun
Microsystems, Varian, and Smart software.
3. Prosecutions for Biomedical and Genetic Piracy
During the first decade since the federal trade secret statute was
enacted, EEA prosecutions were initiated for trade secrets stolen from
a number of important companies in the biotechnology/medical or
pharmaceutical sector of the economy. Biomedical targets included
the Harvard Medical School, Zirmed, Bristol-Myers, and the
Cleveland Clinic. The first EEA prosecution against a foreign
national was filed in 1997 against Taiwanese spies who attempted to
steal research on the anti-cancer drug "Taxol" from Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. 153 In the Taxol trade secret theft case, the prosecution
was filed under Section 1832, rather than Section 1831 which was
reserved for prosecutions against foreign governments, entities, or
agents. The Taxol case was prosecuted for attempted theft of trade
secrets and conspiracy to steal trade secrets. 154
In July of 2005, a Japanese scientist and her Chinese husband
"pleaded not guilty to charges that they transported stolen genetic
information from a Harvard Medical School laboratory where they
once worked." 155 The charges arose out of the alleged theft of certain
trade secrets belonging to Harvard Medical School, including
reagents used to develop new immunosuppressive drugs to control
organ rejection.156 Thirteen out of the forty-eight EEA prosecutions
(27%) from 1996 to 2005 were outright thefts of proprietary or
confidential information from traditional manufacturers. The
remaining targeted industries were mining, telecommunications,
media, engineering, petroleum, and service sectors.
152. See Halligan, supra note 14 (discussing Criminal Case No. 4: 98M37 (E.D. Texas,
Feb. 26, 1998)).
153. United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 202 (3d Cir. 1998).
154. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(4) (2000).
155. Japanese Scientist, Husband Plead Not Guilty in DNA Theft, JAPAN SCIENCE SCAN,
July 18, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 11272094.
156. Id.
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Table Four
Computer or Internet Instrumentality
Method of Trade Secret Theft or Attempt
Other
43.8%
Computer orlInternet
N=48
1996-Aug. 1, 2005
Computers are not only the target of espionage, but also the
instrumentality that enables most trade secret or data theft. A recent
U.S.-CERT study uncovered high or medium vulnerabilities in the
most popular versions of both Windows and UNIX/LINUX operating
systems. 157 Microsoft's Internet Explorer, for example, does not
properly display the location of HTML documents in the status bar.
This known vulnerability lulls some users into revealing sensitive
information such as credit card numbers.1 58 Table Four reveals that
56% of the EEA defendants used computers as the principal
instrumentality to steal trade secrets. The computer and the Internet
permit "new forms of potentially criminal behavior that would not
have been possible without the use of computer technology."' 5 9 The
157. High-risk vulnerabilities were ones that will allow an intruder to immediately access a
computer system or to allow an intruder to execute virulent code or allow unauthorized users to
send sequences of instructions to computer systems. Medium-risk vulnerabilities were defined
as ones that allow intruders privileged access. U.S.-CERT, supra note 11.
158. See United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team-Vulnerability Note
#652278, http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/652278.
159. RALPH D. CLIFFORD, CYBERCRIME; THE INVESTIGATION, PROSECUTION, AND
DEFENSE OF A COMPUTER-RELATED CRIME 2-3 (2001).
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perpetrator used a computer and the Internet to transfer data as
opposed to physically carrying away trade secrets from a firm.
In 54% of the cases, the defendant was charged only with
violation of the EEA. Federal prosecutors also filed ancillary charges
of the Computer Abuse and Fraud Act in 10% of the cases (N=5). 160
A count for Mail Fraud or Wire Fraud was found in another 8% of the
cases prosecuted (N=4). The Interstate Transportation of Stolen
Property Act was an additional charge in five other cases (10%)
whereas federal criminal conspiracy was charged in another six cases
(13%). Overall, these findings confirm the widespread use of
computers and the Internet to transfer stolen trade secrets.
This empirical study of economic espionage in the private sector
parallels findings that computers were frequently the instrumentality
for computer intrusion cases where federal agencies were victimized.
The study by the U.S. Department of Justice concluded that most
cases prosecuted were for attacks on government computer networks,
not private corporate networks.161 Federal prosecutors were unable to
prosecute a single case in which software vulnerabilities resulted in
computer intrusions because most prosecuted cases involved
knowledgeable insiders. This finding is critically important evidence
that EEA prosecutors are failing to detect, let alone punish, the most
sophisticated state-sponsored economic espionage that preys upon
software vulnerabilities. 1 62
160. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) is the single most important federal
statute governing computer crime. The CFAA punishes and deters hacking, creating viruses, and
other forms of computer crime, and extends to all computers involved in interstate commerce.
The CFAA was enacted in 1984 and has been amended several times. Its jurisdiction includes
the Internet. The CFAA prohibits any person from knowingly causing the transmission of
information that intentionally damages a protected computer. It is a violation of the CFAA for
persons to obtain unauthorized access to the computer networks of government agencies and
financial institutions, as well as computers used in interstate or foreign commerce. Michael L.
Rustad, supra note 19, at 89 (footnotes omitted).
161. Id. at 65 (describing prosecutions in intrusions into NASA Jet Propulsion Lab and
U.S. Postal Service computers, and a hack attack on American and Israeli computers).
162. 1 am, of course, making reference to the famous Sherlock Holmes story in which
Holmes found relevance in the fact that the dog kept in the stables did not bark during a
nighttime intrusion. The fact that the dog did not bark created an inference that the intrusion
was by a trusted insider. In this case, the absence of software defect cases reveals that federal
law enforcers lack the resources and expertise to detect intrusions exploiting software
vulnerabilities. See, ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, SILVER BLAZE, THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK
HOLMES 143 (Random House 2002). (describing the "The Simpson incident in which the dog
kept in the stables did not bark.").
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D. FINDING #4: THE SILICON VALLEY AND OTHER HIGH
TECHNOLOGYAREAS WERE TARGETED BY
INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE
Table Five
Jurisdiction of EEA Prosecutions
State of Federal Court Prosecution
Economic Espionage Act
14 -
12-
10.
8-E
4.
02.
00
state
N=48
1996-Aug. 1, 2005
The new battleground for economic espionage concentrates on
information technology, biotechnology, and traditional
manufacturing. 163  Only eighteen out of the fifty-one U.S.
jurisdictions had one or more EEA prosecutions. Table Five shows
that three states, California, New York, and Texas, accounted for
nearly half of all EEA prosecutions for 1996 to 2005. Twenty-seven
percent of the EEA prosecutions were filed in California (N=13),
followed by New York (N=5), and Texas (N=5), each accounting for
10% of the prosecutions. Most states did not have a single federal
court criminal case arising out of an EEA prosecution during the past
decade. A total of only eighteen jurisdictions had one or more
prosecutions in that time period. Most EEA prosecutions were filed
163. HEDIEH NASHERI, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND INDUSTRIAL SPYING 19 (2004).
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in high technology centers of innovation though there was a
smattering of cases filed in other states. This finding reveals that
economic espionage is targeting our country's most sophisticated
technologies.
E. FINDING #5: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT PERPETRATORS.
HIGHLY ED UCA TED MALES WHO TEND TO BE
THE ENEMY WITHIN
Table Six
EEA Defendant's Role
(Insiders vs. Outsiders)
Outsider
27.1%
72.9%
N=48
1996-Aug. 1, 2005
The greatest threat of corporate espionage is not the hacker, but
the enemy within. Employees, ex-employees, and insiders were the
primary wrongdoers in 73% of the EEA prosecutions. Economic
espionage cases are no exception to the rule that insiders are more
likely to misappropriate trade secrets. In Kissane v. United States, the
defendant worked as a release engineer on a software package
marketed to large telecommunications companies abroad. 164 The
defendant sent e-mail messages to two of his employer's competitors
164. See Halligan, supra note 14 (discussing United States v. Thomas Kissane, No.
1:02CR626 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
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offering source code for sale. 165 In another industrial espionage case,
two former Boeing Company managers were charged with the theft of
Lockheed Martin trade secrets for a U.S. Air Force rocket program. 166
Table Nine reveals that federal law enforcement officials participated
in sting operations in slightly more than one in four EEA cases
prosecuted (27%).167 This finding suggests that the government will
only infrequently "devote significant resources to the investigation,
prosecution and enforcement of the EEA."'168
In United States v. Tse Throw Sun, a 31-year old Singapore
national was arrested in an FBI sting operation. 169 The sting began
after an unidentified person called a California translation business
offering to sell customer lists and detailed billing information stolen
from his or her Chicago competitor. The California firm reported
being approached to the FBI and a sting operation was organized.
Masquerading as a company official, an FBI agent purchased material
that included an online profit-and-loss statement, billing summaries,
call counts, and an e-mail message discussing Language Line for
$5,000.170
In ten of the forty-eight EEA prosecutions since 1996, a trade
secret owner's competitor reported being approached by an insider
seeking to sell purloined documents. In United States v. Hsu, a
technical director of a Taiwanese firm contacted an undercover FBI
agent in an attempt to steal trade secrets about anti-cancer drugs from
a pharmaceutical company.171 The defendant told an undercover FBI
agent that his company would pay $400,000 in cash, stock, and
royalties to employees willing to give them documents about the
drug. Most EEA cases were initiated by the targeted company who
165. Id.
166. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Two Former Boeing Managers Charged in Plot to
Steal Trade Secrets from Lockheed Martin (Jun. 25, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/branchCharge.htm (discussing United States v.
Branch and Erskine, No. 03-M-1453 (C.D. Calif.)).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Yang, 74 F. Supp.2d 724 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (involving a
defendant who was caught through joint collaboration of the FBI and the corporate victim);
United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 189 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing EEA investigation
spearheaded by an undercover FBI agent whom the defendant mistakenly believed to be a
technological information broker).
168. NASHERI, supra note 163, at 168.
169. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Chicago, Illinois Man Pleads Guilty to Theft of
Trade Secrets, Offered to Sell Online Interpreter's Information (Apr. 11, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/sunPlea.htm.
170. Id.
171. Hsu, 155 F.3d at 189.
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learned of the theft of trade secrets through their own investigations.
During the first decade of EEA cases, the Department of Justice
initiated complaints generally only after the corporate victim of
espionage had completed the bulk of the investigation.
In United States v. Serebryany, a nineteen-year-old insider stole
access card control information for DirectTV. 172 In United States v
Kissane, the defendant worked as a release engineer on a software
package marketed to large telecommunications companies abroad. 173
The defendant sent e-mail messages to two of his employer's
competitors offering source code for sale. 174 The finding that nearly
three out of four EEA defendants were insiders, employees, or ex-
employees is consistent with an earlier study, which concluded:
that the significant threat to electronic data comes from disgruntled
employees with intimate knowledge of a company's highly
sensitive intellectual property, trade secrets, computer software,
business, financial and customer information, and even DOS
prevention programs. 175
The EEA defendant was an outsider in only thirteen out of forty-
eight federal criminal prosecutions (27%). Corporate spies tend to be
well-educated insiders who are generally professionals or technicians
rather than low-level functionaries.
172. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, L.A. Man Sentenced for Stealing Trade Secrets
Pertaining to 'Smart Card' Technology (Sept. 8, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/serebryanySent.htm.
173. See Halligan, supra note 14 (discussing United States v. Kissane, No. 1:02CR626
(S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
174. Id.
175. Rustad, supra note 19.
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Table Seven
Occupational Status of Perpetrator
Individual Defendant in EEA Prosecution
Unskilled
10.4%
Outsider
20-8%
Mgr or Official
6.3%
Eng/Sci/Res,
37.5%
Technician
25.0%
N=48
1996-2001
Table Seven illustrates that three out of four EEA perpetrators
were single individuals. More than one individual defendant was
charged in approximately 19% of the cases (N=9). A corporation was
charged with industrial espionage in only 6% of the cases (N=3).
Thirty-eight percent of the perpetrators charged with violating the
EEA were engineers, scientists or researchers. Another 25% of the
EEA defendants had occupations classifiable as technicians. The
median EEA defendant is a forty-year-old white-collar male. In 77%
of the cases (N=37) a male was charged. In another 10% of the EEA
cases in the sample, more than one male defendant was named in the
indictment. Females were never perpetrators apart from being named
as co-defendants with male accomplices (N=6). Eight in ten of the
EEA perpetrators were employees, ex-employees, or otherwise
classified as insiders.
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F. FINDING #6: MOST EEA PERPETRATORS WERE
AMERICAN CITIZENS B UT ONE IN FOUR WAS
FROM COUNTRIES OF THE FAR EAST.
Table Eight
Foreign-Born EEA Defendants
40
30
20.
10
0
o) 0-
LISA Idia or Pakistan Australia
Far East Uddle East
Foreign Defendant
N=48
1996-Aug. 1, 2005
Table Eight demonstrates that only a small percentage of foreign
spies are prosecuted under the EEA. The database documents only
one reported case of a computer hacker or virus planter being sued for
espionage under the EEA. Yet, several Chinese companies use
economic espionage to steal computer code from U.S. companies. 176
Trojan horses are used to infect U.S. companies' personal computers
to gather "sensitive documents, like CAD/CAM files used to store,
say, mechanical designs, electronic circuit board schematics and
layouts."'1 77 In May of 2005, the Israeli police arrested twenty-one
persons for using Trojan horse software to steal documents and
images for pending patents from their rivals.178
176. Nathan Vardi, Chinese Take Out, FORBES, July 25, 2005, at 54.
177. Id.
178. Israeli Corporate Spy Scandal, Top Execs Arrested for Allegedly Using Spyware to
Sniff Out Rivals'Strategies, RED HERRING, May 31, 2005, available at
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Chinese industrial spies steal data by linking Internet protocol
addresses to an Internet domain name in Tianjin, China.' 79 The
incident is just the "start of a wave of China-sponsored cybercrime
that will seek out vital trade secrets."1 80 The EEA is playing no role
in detecting, let alone punishing, this type of computer-related
espionage.
G. FINDING #7: EEA INVESTIGATIONS ARE GENERALLY
DONE BY THE VICTIM OF TRADE SECRET THEFT
OR ATTEMPTED THEFT.
Table Nine
Economic Espionage Prosecutions
Law Enforcement Use of Sting Operationso Yes
27.1%
72.9%
N=48
1996 to Aug. 1, 2005
H FINDING #8: THE EEA IS PEA SHOOTER, NOTA
POWERFUL WEAPON IN PUNISHING AND
DETERRING ECONOMC ESPIONAGE.
The EEA law-in-the-books prescribe fines of up to $500,000 for
individuals and corporate fines of up to $5 million for domestic
http://www.redherring.com/Article.aspx?a= 12214&hed-Israel+Corporate+Spy+Scandal (last
visited Apr. 5, 2006).
179. See Vardi, supra note 176.
180. Id.
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espionage. Trade secret theft performed for a foreign government,
entity, or agent can result in fifteen years of jail time. 181 In addition
to fines and jail time, a defendant may have his or her assets forfeited
under the EEA's criminal forfeiture section.1 82 As of August 1, 2005,
the defendant in twenty-two out of forty-eight EEA prosecutions had
not been sentenced or fined. For the twenty-six cases where
sentencing did take place, defendants received home detention or
probation in 19% of the cases (N=5). 183 Another 19% were sentenced
to federal prison for a period up to one year (N=5). 184 The median
criminal sentence was one to three years in federal prison (N=12 or
181.
Persons convicted of violating Section 1831 may be fined up to $500,000 or
imprisoned up to 15 years, or both, while any organization that commits any
offense prohibited by Section 1831 may be fined up to $10,000,000. A person
convicted of violating Section 1832 faces a fine of up to $500,000 or a prison
sentence of up to 10 years, or both, while any organization that commits any
offense described in Section 1832 may be fined up to $5,000,000.
Sorojini J. Biswas, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996,
http://www.myersbigel.com/tsarticles/tradesecret4.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
182.
Section 1834 [of the EEA] provides for the criminal forfeiture of property
obtained or used in the process of violating Sections 1831 or 1832. The section
provides for criminal forfeiture to the United States of any property constituting
or derived from the process of violation of the act, and the forfeiture of any
property used or intended to be used in the furtherance or commitance of the act.
This section may allow, for example, prosecutors and enforcers to dismantle
intemet espionage schemes and seek criminal forfeiture of all computers and
devices used to commit the offenses prohibited by the Act.
Id.
183. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section
(CCIPS) Economic Espionage Act (EEA) Cases,
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/eeapub.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006) (reporting five
months of home detention and a thirty-six month probation for theft of engineering plans by
company insider in United States v. Daddonna (D. Conn. Mar. 12, 2002)); Id. (reporting that ex-
employee received a sentence of twenty-four months probation for the theft of computer source
code in United States v. Dai (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2001); reporting that ex-employee of
California software company received sentence of thirty-six months probation for the theft of
software design documents in United States v. Morch (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2001); and
documenting that outsider received a sentence of sixty months probation for trade secret theft of
software in United States v. Corgnati (S.D. Fla.)).
184. See, e.g., Sorojini J. Biswas, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996,
http://www.myersbigel.com/tsarticles/tradesecret4.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2006) (reporting
sentence of twelve months and a $60,000 fine in EEA case where insider stole customer
information in United States v. Chang (N.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2001)).
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46%).185 Four EEA perpetrators received sentences of between four
and six years (15%).
Fines were imposed in only fourteen out of forty-eight cases.
Fines and forfeitures ranged from $200 to $12,000,000. The median
fine was $50,000. This data drawn from a decade of EEA
prosecutions confirms that the federal statute is a mouse trap, not a
bear trap. 186  The data reveals that EEA convictions result in
sanctions typically given to other white-collar criminals. An
alternative hypothesis is that problems with discovery in a substantive
case mean that federal prosecutors frequently default to lesser crimes
such as attempt or conspiracy. 187
The empirical studies confirm that domestic corporate gnats
outnumber state-sponsored camels by a large margin in the first
decade of EEA prosecutions. The vast majority of the EEA
prosecutions has not been the byproduct of proactive investigations
but is the product of foiled plans to sell trade secrets to competitors.
Most corporate spies caught by federal law enforcement officers were
knowledgeable insiders such as employees, ex-employees, and
consultants, not foreign spies.
Fewer than twenty-five federal district or appellate cases even
mention the EEA in the first decade of prosecutions. 188 Cyberspace is
only the newest economic espionage battleground. "At least one
'Trojan horse' program used to steal files from infected computers
has been traced to servers in China, providing further evidence that
U.S. companies may be targets, say analysts."'1 89
Federal law enforcement has focused on domestic trade secret
theft instead of espionage sponsored by our allies. In all but a few
185. See, e.g., id. (reporting ex-employees' theft of computer source code was punished by
a two year sentence in federal prison in United States v. Kissane (S.D. N.Y. Oct. 15, 2002);
reporting that insider and ex-employee was punished by a fourteen month sentence for stealing
drug delivery system formula in United States v. Rector (M.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2002); and imposing
two year sentence on ex-employee for stealing micro-process or research in United States v. Ow
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2001)).
186. See Chris Carr, Jack Morton & Jerry Furniss, The Economic Espionage Act: Bear
Trap or Mousetrap?, 8 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159 (2000).
187. Susan Brenner suggests that lesser sentences in EEA cases may be explained by the
tendency of prosecutors to default to lesser EEA offenses such as attempts or conspiracies. In
addition, sentences may be reduced because the value of the loss will be non-existent in the case
of a failed attempt to steal trade secrets.
188. A LEXIS/NEXIS search of all cases conducted on July 20, 2005 revealed only
twenty-three cases in which the term Economic Espionage Act was mentioned.
189. Lever, supra note 117.
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cases, large multinational U.S. corporations have been victimized by
trade secret theft. This trend may partially be explained by the fact
that only large companies have the resources to conduct private
investigations. The research findings from the first decade of EEA
cases confirm that high technology, including software and
biomedical industries, are the most common targets for industrial
espionage. The next section proposes that the EEA be amended to
encourage private attorneys general to bridge the enforcement gap in
the present law.
III. REFORMING THE ELECTRONIC ESPIONAGE ACT BY
BRINGING IN THE PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Our tolerance of the espionage game must cease when the
protections required to prevent another's spying cost so much that
the spirit of inventiveness is dampened. 190
In this part of the article, I argue that data intermediaries such as
software vendors should be secondarily liable for economic espionage
when they "'facilitate' the realization of an independently created risk
by doing something that they knew or should have known would
'pave the way' for a third party to harm the victim." 191 The software
industry will vigorously oppose this expansion of liability, arguing
that secondary liability will stifle innovation, punish the wrong entity,
and not be feasible because it is impossible to produce bug-free
software. 192
Increasingly, the justification for third-party liability for
misappropriation must shift from intentional tort actions to the
negligent enablement of trade secret theft.193 Expanded third-party
liability against software providers would help bridge the enforcement
gap left by weak EEA enforcement. The most efficient solution to
this wrongdoing is the "prevention of crime rather than trying to cope
afterwards with the damage it has done."' 194 A fence at the top of the
190. E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co., Inc. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir.
1970).
191. Aaron Twerski & Anthony J. Sebok, Liability Without Cause? Further Ruminations
on Cause-in-Fact as Applied to Handgun Liability, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1379, 1383 (2000).
192. Harris Miller, Penalizing Vendors Brings Consequences, NETWORK WORLD, Apr. 22,
2002, available at http://www.networkworld.com/columnists/2002/0422faceoffno.html.
193. See, e.g., Micro Data Base Sys., Inc. v. Dharma Sys., Inc., 148 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir.
1998) (holding "misappropriation of a trade secret is an intentional tort").
194. GRAEME R. NEWMAN & RONALD V. CLARKE, SUPERHIGHWAY ROBBERY:
PREVENTING E-COMMERCE CRIME xiv (2003).
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cliff is far more efficient than deciding who pays for consequential
damages once trade secrets are misappropriated. The software
industry is just beginning to recognize the importance of building in
security solutions into its products. 195  Despite this promising
development, corporate computer networks are presently at great risk.
A study by an international accounting found that 83% of the officers
at leading financial institutions reported that their computer systems
had been compromised within the past year as compared to only 39%
in 2003. A 2003 CSS/FBI survey of cybercrime concluded that
corporations frequently suffer from the "theft of proprietary
information with the average reported loss of $2.7 million per
incident."'196 In the law of negligence, the greater the risk the greater
the duty and this principle applies equally well to defective software
that enables trade secret theft.
The prima facie case for the EEA statutory tort of negligent
enablement of economic espionage consists of four elements: (1)
Software licensors must have owed their licensees a duty to
implement adequate security in their products and services; 197 (2) the
195. Microsoft, for example, has recently improved the security of its products by building
security related updates into the post-marketing period. Microsoft now automatically sends
security related updates to users rather than requiring users to download patches. Windows XP
automatically checks for fixpacks on the Microsoft Web site, and if it finds them offers to
download them gratis to all users. Most software now automatically checks for updates, at least
when it is installed if not on a schedule after installation. Windows XP, for example,
automatically checks for updates on a regular basis.
196. John B. McCormick, 2003 CS/FBI Survey Cybercrime Survey Shows Reduced Losses,
TECH REPUBLIC, June 23, 2003, http://techrepublic.com.com/5100-6264-5054396.html.
Cybercrime may be divided into many categories, including the illegal use of cryptography,
stock manipulation, offshore scams, e-mail threats, computer viruses, forged e-mail postings,
illegal copying of software, and cyber-terrorism. Daniel P. Schafer, Comment, Canada's
Approach to Jurisdiction over Cybertorts: Braintech v. Kostiuk, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1186,
1190 (2000) (noting cybercrime categories include credit card fraud, unauthorized access to
computer systems, child pornography, software piracy, and cyberstalking and acknowledging
that new crimes are evolving). The harm caused by cybercrime includes financial injuries,
invasion of privacy, compromising of sensitive information, information theft, destruction of
trade secrets, meltdown of computer hard drives, or even threats to public health or security.
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, Computer Intrusion
Cases, http://www.cybercrime.gov/cccases.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2006). "The San Francisco-
based Computer Security Institute (CSI) and the San Francisco Federal Bureau of
Investigation's Computer Intrusion Squad have conducted the CSIFBI survey annually since
1996." Michael Fickes, Behind the Numbers: The FBI Cyber-Crime Survey Results,
GOVERNMENT SECURITY, Aug. 1, 2004, http://govtsecurity.com/mag/behind-numbers-fbi/.
197. Whether the duty is based upon products liability, premises liability or a general
enabling tort, courts must find a duty before the law will recognize Intemet security claims.
Next, they must establish that the online intermediary breached that duty and proximately
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software licensor must have breached the standard of reasonable
computer security either by acts or omissions that created
vulnerabilities or that enabled the theft of trade secrets; 198 (3) the
trade secret's theft or economic espionage must have been negligently
enabled by the software vendor's negligence. 199 In other words, the
defective software products or service was both a cause in fact and a
proximate cause of the plaintiff's harm; 200 and (4) the software
vendor's failure in producing products or services with adequate
security must have caused economic losses to the trade secret
owner.
201
caused harm to the plaintiff. Any duty to protect computer users from the cybercrimes of third
persons must be predicated on a high degree of known, preventable risk.
198. To qualify as a protectible trade secret, the "promise" software, customer list and
prospects list: (1) must be information such as a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique or process; (2) have independent economic value, available from only one
source; and (3) is the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy. See Leske v. Leske,
539 N.W.2d 719, 721-22 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995). In bricks and mortar tort law, courts frequently
turn to custom to determine best practices in a given field. Custom provides the floor, but not
necessarily the ceiling, of reasonable care. A threshold question for setting the standard of care
for the Internet is to examine whether compliance to custom should be a defense against a
negligence claim. In the traditional law of negligence, the greater the risk the greater the
likelihood a court will impose a duty of care. Like preventive medicine, the purpose of
preventive law is to avoid or reduce the risky conditions leading to negligence liability. Yet,
few companies have even a basic understanding of how to protect their computer systems
against the known risks of foreign and domestic data theft. A company has a legal duty to
develop and maintain a computer system that is available, reliable and protects data from
hackers and other intruders.
199. In a negligent enablement of economic espionage case, the corporate victim must
present facts and circumstances that will convince a jury that the data theft or trade secret
misappropriation that caused plaintiffs injury was foreseeable and that the software vendor or
online intermediary was in the best position to reduce the radius of the risk. Foreseeability is the
sine qua non of duty. The greater the risk, the greater the duty of care owed software licensees.
200. It may be difficult to determine whether a software bug, security hole, or
misconfiguration was a "substantial factor," where the security breach was connected to
multiple problems. Courts will grapple with the "cause-in-fact" problem where third party
intruders exploit a variety of security holes on numerous different networks in order to harm
Internet users. Even if the plaintiff establishes actual cause, there may not be recovery if the
causal relationship between the defendant's breach and the plaintiff's losses to cybercrimes are
too remote.
Proximate cause rules are among those rules that seek to determine the
appropriate scope of a negligent defendant's liability. The central goal of the
proximate cause requirement is to limit the defendant's liability to the kinds of
harms he risked by his negligent conduct.... The proximate cause issue, in spite
of the terminology, is not about causation at all but about the appropriate scope of
responsibility.
DANN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 443 (2000).
201. A telecommunications company, for example, could be held liable for providing
insecure software enabling a computer hacker to steal trade secrets. Compensatory damages
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Software providers should be secondarily liable only if they fail
to reasonably secure software through readily available means such as
building automatic security updates into their products and services.
Providers that do not undertake prompt remedial measures in
plugging known security vulnerabilities should be liable for
consequential damages in the form of trade secret theft. Similarly,
vendors that market products with known vulnerabilities frequently
pave the way for state-sponsored economic espionage. 202 Greater
secondary liability imposed against the software vendor will result in
more secure software that prevents economic espionage. The
problem with the Economic Espionage Act is that federal prosecutors
are frequently unable to prosecute primary wrongdoers in a cross-
border legal environment. Suing the intermediary for failing to
prevent the exploitation of known vulnerabilities would largely solve
the cross-border enforcement problem.203
A. The Impenetrable Jungle of Trade Secrets Law
The muddled state of the Economic Espionage Act lies in part
because of the conceptual uncertainty about the nature of trade
secrets. The law of trade secrets was prefigured in Roman law, a
legal regime that protected slave owners against competitors who
may be awarded for lost profits incurred because of trade secret misappropriation. The law of
torts also provides for punitive damages to punish and deter software gatekeepers that fail to
secure computer software with known vulnerabilities and prior similar misappropriations or data
theft.
202. Courts frequently use the concept of proximate cause to limit liability for negligently
enabling the crimes of third parties. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 169 n.21
(2d Cir. 1997) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) ("In other words, could the defendant be held liable for
the criminal acts of an intervener absent any direct relationship with the plaintiff? Historically,
a majority of jurisdictions answered this question in the negative, finding either no duty or no
proximate cause.").
203. Professor Joseph Bauer notes that my proposal to lengthen the EEA lasso by
recognizing private causes of action against primary wrongdoers does not mean we will see
better cross-border enforcement if the foreign government is unwilling to enforce civil actions.
It is expected that private attorneys general will have even greater difficulty obtaining
jurisdiction or enforcing judgments against foreign agents, instrumentalities and governments
than the current regime of criminal law enforcement. An American company will not have the
means to enforce civil actions against primary wrongdoers when espionage claims are brought
against foreign nationals and foreign corporations for conduct taking place abroad. A
multilateral treaty would be required to reach conduct beyond the borders of the United States.
The private cause of action against the primary wrongdoer will not lead to appreciably more
enforcement in the cross-border environment in the absence of an Economic Espionage
Convention or specific remedies of extradition for economic espionage be made part of the
TRIPS Agreement. The private cause of action for negligent enablement will be against the
available intermediary therefore bypassing many of these problems.
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induced their slaves to disclose confidential information.204 It is quite
likely that Roman trade secret protection was too different from
modem trade secret protection to offer much guidance. 205 Today, the
formula for Coca-Cola is perhaps the best known example of a trade
secret, having been a closely guarded secret since the company's
founding in 1892.212
The current law of trade secrets requires that the "the
appropriator must have acquired, disclosed, or used the information in
a wrongful manner. ' 207 The law of trade secrets is the bastard
stepchild of the common law that is alternatively classified as a tort,
contract, property or even the breach of a confidential relationship.
Professor Bone describes trade secrets as an anomalous branch of
intellectual property because "it does not impose liability for mere
appropriation. '208
1. Trade Secret Misappropriation as Tort Action
Trade secret misappropriation, whether direct or contributory, is
essentially a tort and implies the invasion of some legally protected
right of the owner. The common law of trade secrets was first
conceptualized as a business tort in the nineteenth century.209 Since
then, trade secret protection has been reconceptualized to provide
protection on not only a tort theory, but also on a contract or property
theory. Trade secret protection is "one of the last areas of intellectual
property that is not covered by a federal statute granting a private
right of action to trade secret owners." 210 While the general contours
of trade secrets law are governed by state law, federal issues are
frequently found in trade secrets litigation. 211
204. A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law: The Actio Servi Corrupti, 30
COLUM. L. REv. 837 (1930); Herbert David Klein, The Technical Trade Secret Quadrangle: A
Survey, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 437, 437 (1960-1961).
205. Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification,
86 CALIF. L. REv. 241, 244 (1998) (contending that Roman law prefiguring trade secret
protection is not comparable to modem trade secret law).
206. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796, 799 (3d Cir. 1920).
207. Bone, supra note 205.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 245.
210. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 20.
211. See Jerry Cohen, Federal Issues in Trade Secret Law, Trade Secret Seminar, Suffolk
University Law School Center for Advanced Legal Studies, Co-Sponsored with Boston Patent
Law Association, (Mar. 14, 2003) at 29-30 (unpublished paper on file with author) (discussing
numerous federal statutes having relevance to trade secret practice including the Federal
Employees Trade Secret Act, Government Procurement Regulations, Freedom of Information
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The First Restatement of Torts, published in 1939, extracted a
relatively clear definition and a set of liability rules from a confusing
body of precedent. 212 The Restatement (First) Torts section 757, still
followed by important states such as Massachusetts and New York,
states that:
[o]ne who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a
privilege to do so, is liable to another if . .(c) he learned the secret
from a third person with notice of the fact that it was secret and
that the third person discovered it by improper means or that the
third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to
another.2 13
The Restatement of Torts section 757 comment b (1939)
provides the following factors in determining what information is
protected as a trade secret:
An exact definition of a trade secret is not possible. Some factors
to be considered in determining whether given information is one's
trade secret are: the extent to which the information is known
outside of his business; the extent to which it is known by
employees and others involved in his businesses; the extent of
measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of this information; the
value of the information to him and to his competitors; the amount
of effort or money expended by him in developing the information;
the ease or difficulty with which the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others.2 14
The American Law Institute approved the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition in 1995. The Restatement (Third) defines trade
Act (FOIA) Trade Secret Exceptions to Sunshine Government and Federal Agencies'
Responsibilities and Options re Trade Secrets, Wiretap Act, Electronic Communications Privacy
Act, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Economic Espionage Act, and the Interstate Transport of
Stolen Property Act).
At the time of the passage of Title I of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, the
only federal statute prohibiting the misappropriation of trade secrets was the
Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905, which was of limited utility because it did
not apply to private sector employees and it provided only minor criminal
sanctions.
J. Michael Chamblee, Validity, Construction, and Application of Title I of Economic Espionage
Act of 1996, 177 A.L.R. Fed. 609, 617 (2005) . "The EEA's broad definition of trade secrets
represents the first time federal legislation has specifically protected intangible property without
additional requirements, such as transmission of such property through the mail or through a
wire transmission." Albert, Sanders & Mazzaro, supra note 83, at 635.
212. Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 20, at 233.
213. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
214. Id.
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secrets broadly to include "any information that can be used in the
operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently
valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic
advantage over others. ' 215  The tort of misappropriation requires
plaintiffs to prove three elements: (1) the existence of a trade secret,
(2) the acquisition of the secret as a result of a confidential
relationship, and (3) unauthorized use of the secret. 216
2. Trade Secret as Breach of Contract or Confidential
Relationship
Employers, ex-employees, and other insiders who have breached
a nondisclosure agreement, a fiduciary or confidential relationship are
the most likely defendants in trade secret cases. As Professor Bone
explains, "The relational focus of trade secret's liability rules aligns
trade secret law more closely with the law of contract than with the
law of property." 217 A growing number of U.S. companies require
their employees, consultants, independent contractors, joint venturers,
and other insiders to enter into signed nondisclosure agreements
(NDAs), an agreement to protect the secrecy of trade secrets and other
confidential business information.
A NDA is a contract in which an employee or other person
expressly promises to keep a trade secret unless there is express
authorization or approval from the owner. Contract is the principal
legal device that trade secret owners use to demonstrate that
information is secret and to bind employees and others by a
confidential relationship or duty. By definition, the wrongdoer is
liable for trade secret misappropriation for breach of a duty of
confidence, breaching a contractual duty, or otherwise acquiring the
information by misrepresentation or outright thievery. 218
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) is based largely upon a
relational theory of contracts and confidential relations defining
"improper means" for acquiring trade secrets as encompassing "theft,
bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of duty
to maintain secrecy, or espionage through electronic or other
215. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
216. Lemmon v. Hendrickson, 559 N.W.2d 278, 279 (Iowa 1997); See also Hudson Hotels
Corp. v. Choice Hotels Int'l, 995 F.2d 1173, 1176 (2d Cir. 1993).
217. Bone, supra note 205, at 244.
218. Id. at 244.
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means." 219Similarly, UTSA defines misappropriation as using
improper means to acquire a trade secret where the protected
information was acquired by breaching a duty to maintain secrecy. 220
The U.S. Supreme Court in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.221
held that trade secret law was not preempted by patent law and
"encourage[s] invention in areas where patent law does not reach. '222
The Court stated that trade secret law contributed to "commercial
ethics and the encouragement of invention," 223 and adumbrated the
principle of "good faith and honest, fair dealing [which] is the very
life and spirit of the commercial world. '224  The underlying
jurisprudence behind trade secret protection is that an owner should
have a remedy if the essential element of secrecy is lost due to a
breach of confidence by someone obligated to keep information
secret.
3. Trade Secrets as Intellectual Property
In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held
that trade secrets were classifiable as property protected under the
Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution.225  In Ruckelshaus,
Monsanto filed suit claiming that data disclosures about its
insecticides to the Environment Protection Agency amounted to a
taking without just compensation by the Environment Protection
219. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(1) (amended 1985).
220.
Misappropriation means: (i) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person
who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper
means; or (ii) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or
implied consent by a person who
(A) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(B) at the time of disclosure or use knew or had reason to know that his
knowledge of the trade secret was (I) derived from or through a person
who has utilized improper means to acquire it; (I1) acquired under
circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use;
or (III) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person
seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) before a material change of his position, knew or had reason to know
that it was a trade secret ad that knowledge of it had been acquired by
accident or mistake.
Id. § 1(2).
221. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974).
222. Id. at 485.
223. Id. at 481.
224. Id.
225. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
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Agency. The Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972
contained a provision for mandatory public disclosure of information
learned through the EPA's pesticide-registration procedure. 226 The
1972 Amendments "did not specify standards for the designation of
submitted data as 'trade secrets or commercial or financial
information. '227
Monsanto was one of a handful of companies that invented and
developed "new active ingredients for pesticides and conduct most of
the research and testing with respect to those ingredients. '228 The
Court had little difficulty holding that trade secrets were protected by
the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution as well as by
Missouri's takings clause. 229 Richard Epstein views the Monsanto
case as the linchpin for his argument that trade secrets are property. 230
Professor Epstein sees much common ground between trade secrets
and the other branches of intellectual property law:
[T]he logic for protecting trade secrets parallels that for protecting
patents and copyrights. People will not develop certain forms of
information at private cost if the benefits of that information can be
immediately socialized by the unilateral actions of others. Patents
grant the right to exclude only to individuals who disclose their
information. This disclosure can, especially with processes and
know-how, undermine its value to the owner because of his
inability to monitor its use by others. So long as a product may be
made in multiple ways, the owner cannot learn of the
misappropriation of his invention from the mere appearance of that
product on the market. Trade secrets offer both an alternative to
patent protection for inventions, and an exclusive source of
protection for matters as diverse as know-how, recipes, and
customer lists.231
Richard Epstein acknowledges one major difference between
trade secrets and other intellectual property. Once a trade secret is
disclosed to the public, the value of the intellectual property
evaporates. 232 The unprotected disclosure of a trade secret will cause
226. Id. at 992.
227. Id. at 993.
228. Id. at 997.
229. Id. at 1003-04.
230. Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets Under the Takings
Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 57, 61 (2004).
231. Id.at57.
232. Id.
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the information to forfeit its trade secret status, since "[i]nformation
that is generally known or readily ascertainable through proper means
by others ... is not protectible as a trade secret. '233 Once trade
secrets are made public they may not be rescued, which is not true of
any other branch of intellectual property law. Other scholars question
the classification of trade secrets as property:
In trade secrecy law, as in the information privacy law
contemplated in this article, there is no need to say that a property
right exists in the protected information. Although courts have
sometimes loosely referred to trade secrets as the "property" of the
firm that licensed them and have on occasion held trade secrets to
be property for certain purposes, the more appropriate way to
characterize the firm's interest in a trade secret is to say that the
law protects the firm against breaches of contracts and confidential
understandings. 234
One of the basic attributes of property is the right of possession.
Trade secrets are the one branch of intellectual property law where
rights may be granted to the owner even if he or she has no exclusive
rights of possession. The owners of a copyright, trademark, or patent
have exclusive rights, whereas trade secrets may be shared because of
the right of reverse engineering. As the drafters of the Uniform Trade
Secret Act observe:
Under both the Act and common law principles, for example, more
than one person can be entitled to trade secret protection with
respect to the same information, and analysis involving the
"reverse engineering" of a lawfully obtained product in order to
discover a trade secret is permissible. 235
Finally, trade secrets are private and by definition kept from the
public view so there is not the same exchange of a limited monopoly
to advance science or public knowledge. The public interest is
advanced in every branch of intellectual property save trade secrets.
Trade secrets are unlike other intellectual property in that there is no
engineered consensus as to whether protection should be classified as
a branch of the law of torts, contracts, intellectual property, or
whether the action should be for breach of fiduciary duty or an
implied covenant of good faith and dealing.
233. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995).
234. Pamela Samuelson, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm? Privacy as
Intellectual Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1153 (2000).
235. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Prefatory Note (amended 1985).
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B. Third-Party Liability for Misappropriation
As the last section demonstrates, trade secrets lack the
conceptual cohesiveness of other branches of intellectual property
law. This section hypothesizes the reasons why secondary liability
has been so late to develop in trade secrets law whereas the doctrine is
well developed in every other branch of intellectual property law.236
In the formative era of the software industry, the law of trade secrets
was the preferred means to protect code because of the uncertainty
whether copyright or patent protection were available. Yet, no case
law ever developed making a software producer liable for enabling or
inducing trade secret theft. The next subsection briefly summarizes
the developed nature of secondary liability in patent and copyright
law in contrast to the undeveloped secondary liability doctrine in the
law of trade secrets.
1. Secondary Liability in Patent Law
Direct infringement of copyrights, patents, and trademarks is a
strict liability offense with no requirement of proving the infringer's
state of mind, while trade secret misappropriation is often
conceptualized as an intentional business tort.23 7  In contrast,
contributory infringement often centers on a negligence-like standard
of knowledge of infringement as well as proof of direct infringement
in every branch of intellectual property law except trade secrets.
Under patent law, for example, contributory infringement has been
codified to apply to sellers who incorporate "a component...
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be
especially made or especially adapted for use in a [direct]
236. Robert Bone made this point in a conversation we had just prior to the Santa Clara
University School of Law Conference on Third-Party Liability in Intellectual Property Law,
Oct. 7, 2005. Professor Bone also made this argument in his commentary on my paper
presented at the Symposium. Professor Bone contends that trade secret is the only branch of
intellectual property law without a strong secondary liability tradition. See, e.g., Inwood Lab.,
Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 (1982) (holding that secondary trademark liability may
be imposed "if a manufacturer or distributor intentionally induces another to infringe a
trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one whom it knows or has reason to know is
engaging in trademark infringement") (trademarks); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (expanding the theory of contributory liability to
encompass inducement theory in addition to contributory and vicarious infringement) (copyright
law); and 35 U.S.C. § 271 (incorporating contributory infringement into the 1952 Patent Act).
237. See, e.g., New York Scaffolding Co. v. Whitney, 224 F. 452, 459 (8th Cir. 1915)
("One who makes and sells articles which are only adapted to be used in a patented combination
will be presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts .. ") (cited in 5 DONALD S.
CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.02[l] (2005)).
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infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of
commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use. .... -238 The
doctrine of contributory infringement in patent law originated from
the law of torts, not intellectual property.239
Lower court decisions frequently applied the tort theory of
aiding and abetting to hold sellers liable for marketing unpatented
components with no purpose but to be part of an infringing
combination. The statutory law of contributory infringement was
prefigured in the 1871 case of Wallace v. Holmes,240 where for the
first time in Anglo-American legal history, a court held a seller liable
for supplying an unpatented component of a product with no use
except in an infringing combination. 241 The court traces the path of
secondary liability in patent law to also include sellers whose
products had innocent as well as infringing uses but where "the
defendant actively encouraged or induced direct infringement. '242
The contributory infringement doctrine was incorporated into the
Patent Act in 1952 when "Congress enacted Sections 271(b), 271(c),
and 271(d) in order to clarify and stabilize the law of contributory
infringement.1243 Charles Adams' historical survey of third-party
liability in patent law confirms that most contributory infringement
cases in patents center on a defendant's knowledge as well as acts
inducing infringement. While there is no requirement that the
plaintiff prove intent to induce infringement, litigation often centers
"on a variety of promotional activities including advertising
infringing uses of the defendant's products,.., and explaining how
the defendant's products may be used to infringe a patent. '244
2. Secondary Copyright Liability
Contributory infringement is established where the defendant
"with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or
238. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).
239. Alfred P. Ewert & Irah H. Donner, Will the New Information Superhighway Create
'Super' Problems for Software Engineers? Contributory Infringement of Patented or
Copyrighted Software-Related Applications?, 4 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 155, 164 (1994).
240. Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871) (No. 17,100).
241. 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.02[l] (2005).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement, 22
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 389 (2006).
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materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another. '245 The
elements of contributory infringement are knowledge of the primary
wrongdoers' infringing activity, 246 and a showing that the third-party
secondary infringer induced, caused, or materially contributed to the
infringing activity. 247 In Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., the
operators of a swap meet allowed vendors to sell counterfeit
Latin/Hispanic music recordings, which violated the plaintiffs
copyrights and trademarks. 248 The plaintiff sued the Cherry Auction
swap meet alleging copyright infringement, contributory and
vicarious copyright infringement, as well as contributory trademark
infringement.249
The appeals court observed that there simply was no question
about whether the Cherry Auction and its operators knew of
infringing activities because the swap meet had been the target of a
raid seizing more than 38,000 counterfeit recordings in a 1991 raid.250
The Ninth Circuit found that Cherry Auction had the "formal,
contractual ability to control the direct infringer" which was a
necessary element of vicarious liability.251  The court had little
difficulty finding vicarious copyright liability because of Cherry
Auction and its operators "pervasive participation in the formation
and direction" of the direct infringers, including promoting them (i.e.,
creating an audience for them). 252 The Ninth Circuit also found
contributory copyright infringement to be easily established since the
swap meet operators knowingly contributed to the infringement by
providing the site for the activity. Finally, the court held that
contributory trademark infringement existed because defendants were
"willfully blind" to the ongoing infringement. 253
245. Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971); See, e.g., Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Webbworld, 968 F. Supp. 1171 (N.D. 1997), aff'd, 168
F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding the defendant liable for direct as well as secondary copyright
liability).
246. To prevail on a contributory or vicarious copyright claim, a plaintiff must show direct
infringement by a third party. UMG Records, Inc. v. MP3.Com Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13293 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2000) (concluding that MP3.com was a willful infringer imposing
statutory damages of 25,000 for each copyrighted compact disc in the defendant's online
database).
247. See Gershwin Publ'g, 443 F.2d at 1162.
248. Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 261 (9th Cir. 1996).
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at263.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 265.
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In the recent Grokster case, The Supreme Court has taken
secondary liability one step further, expanding upon an inducement of
infringement theory first articulated in the patent law cases. 254 In
Grokster, the Court expanded the doctrine of contributory
infringement to include a theory of inducement imported from patent
law, holding that Grokster and Streamcast's statements or actions
directed to promoting infringement could trigger liability for
contributory infringement. 255
3. The Poverty of Third-Party Liability in the Law of Trade
Secrets
Third-party liability for trade secret misappropriation is rarely
imposed, though it may be possible to impose liability on the
recipients of unauthorized trade secret transfers if it can be proven
that these persons "knew or had reason to know that they are the
recipients of unauthorized trade secret information. '256 Third-party
liability is a critical component of trade secrets law because third
parties are often the only ones with "deep pockets" for the recovery of
damages for trade secret violations. Trade secrets law is unlike any
other branch of intellectual property because of its dearth of
secondary liability rules. 257 There is little by way of commentary on
why secondary liability has been so slow to develop for trade secrets.
Software code, for example, may contributorily infringe a patent,
but there is no secondary liability imposed when a software provider
paves the way or facilitates for trade secret misappropriation. 258
Secondary liability for trade secret misappropriation is well
established in the rare case in which there is proof that an employee
was induced to transfer trade secrets from his former employer to his
254. In this section, I draw upon Jay Dratler's superb presentation at this symposium. For
an illuminating discussion of the ways in which the court drew upon patent law to construct a
theory of contributory infringement in copyright, see Jay Dratler, Jr., Common-Sense (Federal)
Common Law Adrift in a Statutory Sea, or Why Grokster was a Unanimous Decision, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 413 (2006).
255. Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005).
256. R. Mark Halligan, Third-Party Liability for Trade Secret Misappropriation,
http://my.execpc.com/-mhallign/3party.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
257. This point was brought home to me in a discussion I had with Professors Robert Bone
and Joseph Bauer at a breakfast meeting the day of the Santa Clara Conference on Third-Party
Liability in Intellectual Property Law.
258. "Under the present law, new software created by a software architect may
contributorily infringe a patent that does not even mention software." Ewert & Donner, supra
note 239, at 158.
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current employer. This form of indirect or secondary liability is
frequently predicated upon intentional business torts, which have only
a tangential connection to the concept of intellectual property. 259
Injunctions are frequently used to enforce nondisclosure agreements
or covenants not to compete because legal remedies for breach of
contract are inadequate. Third-party liability centers on contract and
tort, not intellectual property. The central issue in these cases is
whether a contractual or quasi-tort confidential duty has been
breached.260
Currently, no court has extended secondary liability to
negligence making third parties accountable for negligently enabling
liability for third-party misappropriation, even where the vendor was
willfully blind to known defects. The next section argues that
Congress needs to reform the Economic Espionage Act to recognize a
negligent enablement cause of action. Imposing greater liability on
the software industry for marketing products known to enable
cybercrime will only impact economic espionage cases where access
to computers is gained due to a software defect. As in other areas of
secondary liability, federal common law standards will evolve to set
standards for the storage or transmission of trade secrets on computer
systems.261
C. Why Trade Secrets Must be Federalized
Trade secrets law is an island of predominately state law in an
increasingly federalized body of intellectual property law. Small and
medium-sized companies that are victimized by trade secret
misappropriation currently have no recourse even if they can identify
the primary wrongdoer. Private civil enforcement is the norm in the
law of copyrights where the victims of infringement have banded
together to form private policing. The U.S. Software and Information
Industry Association formed private policing to punish and deter
259. Secondary liability is statutorily conferred by the Patent Act of 1952, which expressly
provides for liability for active inducement and contributory infringement. See 35 U.S.C. § 271.
See generally, Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement,
Symposium Issue, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369 (2006). The Supreme
Court has borrowed from patent law in extending secondary liability to copyright. See generally
Dratler, Jr., supra note 254.
260. Mixing Equip. Co. v. Philadelphia Gear, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1269 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
(preliminarily enjoining the competitor from employing the former employee, or from obtaining
the designer's trade secrets from the former employee).
261. See generally Dratler, Jr., supra note 254.
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copyright infringement both here and abroad. Even so, an estimated
"$7.5 billion worth of American software is illegally copied and
distributed annually. '262 Congress provided for a private attorney
general role for the victims of unfair competition and trademark
dilution when it enacted the 1946 Lanham Act. The Lanham Act
gives trademark owners standing to file suit against infringers for
unfair and deceptive trade practices in federal courts. The Lanham
Act arms private litigants with tort-like consumer remedies, including
a remedy for statutory multiple damages to rectify unfair commercial
practices. 263
Trade secrets are the province of state law whereas patent law
and copyrights are purely federal branches of intellectual property
law. The law of trademarks is hydra-headed with both state and
federal rights and remedies. While the general contours of trade
secrets law are governed by state law, federal issues are frequently
found in trade secrets litigation.264
Arming private attorneys general with a negligent enablement
tort action will give small and medium firms the possibility of
collecting consequential damages as well as punitive damages against
intermediaries who enable cyberthefts of trade secrets.
One of the policy alternatives would be to relegate all private
enforcement to state causes of action. After all, forty-five states have
already enacted some version of The Uniform Trade Secrets Act that
codified the basic principles of the common law tort of
misappropriation.265 The model act, for example, defines a trade
secret to mean:
262. Rustad, supra note 19, at 101.
263.
Any person who ... uses in commerce . .. any false designation of origin, false
or misleading description of fact, or false of misleading representation of fact...
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is
likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
264. See sources cited supra note 211.
265. Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Indiana, Louisiana, Rhode Island and Washington
adopted the original 1979 version of the UTSA. Another thirty-eight states have adopted the
1985 amended UTSA: Alabama. Alaska Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. See Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few
Facts about the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
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information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program,
device, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure
or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 266
The Uniform Trade Secret Act (UTSA) is a lot less uniform than
its title suggests. Table Five lists Massachusetts and New York as
economic espionage hot spots and neither state has adopted UTSA.
These states are among the handful of states that continue to follow
the First Restatement's approach to the tort of misappropriation.
Further, there is far less uniformity than one might expect among the
states adopting UTSA because of different interpretations in state
courts as well as non-uniform amendments. The Georgia Supreme
Court, for instance, continues to make a distinction between "head
knowledge" and "trade secrets" despite the fact that this distinction is
not part of the UTSA. 267 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit applying
Illinois law incorporates that doctrine into Illinois' version of the
UTSA. 268
In contrast, the Arkansas Supreme Court no longer distinguishes
between head knowledge and written customer information after
adopting the UTSA.269 Non-uniformity among the states will be an
even greater problem when private litigants file civil actions against
foreign actors or instrumentalities alleging economic espionage.
Federal courts are far more experienced when dealing with cross-
border issues such as comity, international jurisdiction, and
enforcement of judgments. Federal courts are also more qualified in
adjudicating cases involving complex intellectual property issues than
are state courts.
Trade secret protection remains the only branch of intellectual
property without a federal private attorneys general role. 270 Arming
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utsa.asp (last visited Apr. 6,
2006). See also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 177 (West Supp.
2004).
266. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985).
267. Randall Scott Hetrick, Employee "Head Knowledge" and the Alabama Trade Secrets
Act, 47 ALA. L. REV. 513, 522 (1996).
268. Id.
269. Id. at 523.
270. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 20, at 233 n.34.
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private litigants with a federal remedy for economic espionage against
the software providers that induce or pave the way for
misappropriation brings common sense to the common law by
supplementing lax public enforcement with private enforcement by
largely corporate victims.
D. The Federal Civil Action for Negligent Enablement
To date, no court has extended the misappropriation tort to make
third parties accountable for negligently enabling third-party spies.
The federal negligent enablement cause of action will draw in large
part upon the common law. As a threshold matter, a litigant will need
to prove that they suffered consequential damages from defective
software in the form of loss of a trade secret. Corporate and
individual victims of trade secret will need to prove three elements:
(1) the existence of a trade secret, (2) the acquisition of the secret as a
result of a confidential relationship, and (3) unauthorized use of the
secret.271
To qualify as a trade secret: (1) the information must be neither
generally known nor readily ascertainable; (2) the information must
derive independent economic value from secrecy; and (3) the plaintiff
must make reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.272 The additional
element will be that a software defect was a substantial factor in
enabling the theft of a trade secret. The EEA private cause of action
for negligent enablement would base its standard of care on common-
law processes because abstract statutory standards would be difficult
to draft in an era of rapidly changing technologies. 273 It is likely that
industry custom, the Learned Hand risk/utility test, and professional
standards of care would evolve to apply in computer security cases. 274
Courts are experienced in determining standards of care in finding
271. Lemmon v. Hendrickson, 559 N.W.2d 278, 279 (Iowa 1997); See also Hudson Hotels
Corp. v. Choice Hotels Int'l, 995 F.2d 1173, 1176 (2d Cir. 1993).
272. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3)(A) (2005); See also Widmark v. Northrup King Co., 530 N.W.2d
588, 592 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
273. Jay Dratler argues that the common-law approach is more likely to evolve to meet
changes in technology than drafting cumbersome statutory standards of care. See Dratler, Jr.,
supra note 254.
274. The type and degree of Internet security required will depend upon the industry.
Financial institutions will calibrate their Internet security to minimize risks such as internal
corruption, illegal money laundering, hackers and the attempts of Internet competitors to steal
confidential customer information. Universities have a statutory duty to protect the personal
information of their students. Companies in general will have a duty to minimize the known
risks of identity theft, impostor web sites, viruses, data destruction and the invasion of privacy.
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whether a trade secret owner used reasonable means to protect its
trade secrets. It is a closely related question whether the software
provider supplied reasonably secure software to protect those secrets.
As computer security is ratcheted upwards, it is likely that statutory
standards of care will be prescribed in specific industries.
The extent of computer security measures taken by the owner of
the trade secret need not be absolute, but must be reasonable under
the circumstances. 275  Trade secret protection is predicated upon
reasonable measures to protect the confidentiality of information,
rather than the standard of all available measures irrespective of cost
or effort.276 Foreseeability in federal trade secret misappropriation
cases could be established by the "prior similars" test, which is
frequently used in premises liability litigation. Under this approach,
foreseeability is established by evidence of prior security breaches
leading to economic or industrial espionage. Courts would have the
most flexibility in choosing either a "totality of the circumstances" or
a "balancing" test. 277 A court using either of these approaches could
look at all of the relevant circumstances including number, nature,
and location of prior data misappropriations. The drawback with this
mechanical methodology is that it can lead to subjective outcomes
regarding either the number or degree of similarity in cybercrimes.
Courts might examine all of the relevant circumstances including
number, nature, and location of prior instances of domestic or foreign
spying to determine whether a third party should fortify computer
security. A financial institution could, for instance, have a secondary
tort action against a software vendor whose products did not
implement security precautions meeting industry standards.
In the final analysis, the recognition of new tort duties is a
policy-based determination. The judiciary will need to balance such
factors as the foreseeability of the harm of computer intrusions or
other breaches of security, the degree of certainty between software
vulnerabilities and harm, the closeness of the connection between lax
Internet security practices and the injury suffered by a computer user;
the policy of preventing future intrusions; the burden on the
275. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l v. Holden Found. Seeds, 35 F.3d 1226, 1236 (8th Cir.
1994) (describing steps taken by plaintiff to safeguard genetic messages of its genetically
engineered corn).
276. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970)
(holding that a plaintiff had no obligation to enclose its unfinished factory to prevent a
competitor's use of aerial photographs to unveil secret).
277. Id. at 1017 (describing these approaches).
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information industry and the consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to maintain adequate security; and the availability,
costs and prevalence of security solutions as well as insurance. 278
The vendors of computer software and networks are frequently
in the best position to develop products and services with built-in
computer security to protect trade secrets. Imposing a duty to
implement reasonable security in Internet infrastructure will
significantly reduce the radius of the espionage danger.2 79 Software
licensors are also in the best position to test their product and
remediate bugs and holes in the post-marketing period. 280
Software vendors that market products with known
vulnerabilities and online intermediaries who do not implement
adequate security foreseeably enable cybercriminals to intercept data
and misappropriate trade secrets. An indeterminate number of
computer intrusions are caused by known security vulnerabilities that
aid or abet unauthorized computer intrusions.281 The public policy
278. These factors are drawn from Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).
279.
History has shown that proactive companies that follow a handful of essential
security practices will fare better against malicious code exploits. These controls
include protections such as file attachment filtering; specific configuration for
routers, email clients, email servers, Web browsers, and business applications
that are generally easy to implement, require infrequent updates, and go
unnoticed by the average user because of their transparency.
Press Release, TruSecure, Malicious Code Problem Continues to Worsen, According to 9th
Annual ICSA Labs Virus Prevalence Survey (Mar. 22, 2004),
http://www.trusecure.com/company/press/pr_20040322.shtml (on file with the Santa Clara
Computer & High Technology Law Journal). In many cases, an online intermediary such as a
website is in the least cost avoider in the best position to thwart hackers and other wrongdoers
by implementing cost-effective security measures.
280. There would be no need for a defense of contributory negligence because a trade
secret owner's own negligence would preclude a lawsuit against a third party for negligent
enablement of trade secret misappropriation or economic espionage. Security breaches in many
cases are not due to third party hackers but to inadequate security precautions being taken by
software users. Many of these precautions are neither expensive nor difficult to undertake. No
action for negligent enablement should be available for trade secret owners that fail to
implement reasonable security. Negligent enablement claims against software licensors would
not be cognizable where trade secret theft is by insiders since they are not misappropriating data
because of a defect in software. Typically, such insiders have access to the electronic systems so
they gain and steal data via their legitimate access, not due to exploiting security flaws in
software.
281. The term, "defective software" encompasses software that fails to produce an accurate
result when used according to instructions, or that fails to conform to contract specifications in
some other manner. Failure is interpreted broadly, to encompass not only "incorrect" results, but
also such matters as the absence of promised features, or the tendency to crash in use. David
Polin, Proof of Manufacturer's Liability for Defective Software, 68 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts
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reason for imposing secondary liability on software publishers is to
raise the level of Internet or computer security and reduce the level of
economic or industrial espionage.282
The empirical findings in Part Two of this article demonstrate
that software and the computer industry are primary targets for trade
secret theft. Defectively designed software and computer networks
enable trade secret theft, however federal law enforcement has yet to
detect-let alone punish-such wrongdoing. 283 The 2001 CSIIFBI
Computer Crime and Security Survey found the Internet connection
to be the point of attack in 70% of computer intrusions.284 One in four
"Internet application service providers (ASPs) were found to have
substandard protection against security breaches and viruses. '285
"CGI scripts are a major source of security holes. Although the CGI
(Common Gateway Interface) protocol is not inherently insecure, CGI
scripts must be written with just as much care as the server itself. '286
The availability of properly configured technologies to prevent
cybercrime is a key factor in assessing the adequacy of existing
safeguards. 287 The imposition of secondary liability for trade secret
misappropriation is a necessary incentive to raise the level of
computer security in the industry.
333 § 1 (2002). Courts have been unreceptive to aiding and abetting claims based on secondary
liability. Lawsuits against Visa and MasterCard for aiding and abetting the users of Napster and
Grokster were dismissed. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l. Serv. Ass'n, No. C 04-00371
JW, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27477 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2004) and Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBiI, LLC,
340 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (C.D. Cal. 2004); see also Cohen, supra note 211.
282. The Ninth Circuit ruled the software vendors were protected from secondary liability
claims even if they knew that the service was primarily used to download copyrighted materials.
Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2004) (ruling
that peer-to-peer file sharing software was capable of substantial non-infringing uses and
therefore distribution of the software was protected by fair use).
283. Defectively designed software is a widespread problem. Apart from security
problems, software may have design defects that cause problems with formatting, processing
speeds, the amount of data that could be handled, and problem of system integration with other
software components or users. Michael L. Rustad, Making UCITA More Consumer-Friendly, 18
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 547, 573 (1999) (citing survey of computer cases
regarding bad software conducted by Michael Rustad and Cynthia Anthony).
284. Richard Power, 2001 CSI/FBI Computer Crime & Security Survey, COMPUTER
SECURITY ISSUES & TRENDS (Computer Security Inst., San Francisco, CA), Spring 2001, at 8.
285. Many ASPs Have Substandard Protection against Security Breaches-IDC, AFX,
Mar. 8, 2002 (citing worldwide "survey of 50 ASPS finding that 25% lacked fundamentals such
as user authentication, virus protection, network security and firewall services").
286. World Wide Web Consortium, World Wide Web Security FAQ,
http://www.w3.org/Security/faq/wwwsfl .html#GEN-Q5 (last visited Apr. 6, 2006.
287. The negligent enablement tort does not address the problem of trade secret theft by
insiders who exploit trust and access rather than vulnerabilities in software.
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E. Bringing in the Private Attorney General
One way to stem the tide of trade secret theft would be for
Congress to permit the victims to sue software vendors and other
intermediaries for the negligent enablement of cybercrime. One
approach would be to hold software manufacturers liable for
negligent design of their products or processes that enable foreign and
domestic spies to exploit known vulnerabilities, bugs, or holes in
software products and services.288 One of the great weaknesses of the
EEA is that it under-deters corporate spies. At present, there is a low
probability of detection and an even lower probability of punishment.
The criminal side of the law is more difficult to prove because of the
elevated standard of beyond a reasonable doubt:
The EEA is a criminal statute; thus the burden of proof is on the
government and each element of every offense must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. This may prove to be a difficult burden
to shoulder, especially in satisfying the proof of the requisite intent
(i.e., the intent to injure the owner of the trade secret, or the
knowing theft of a trade secret). The existence of the criminal
remedy may also complicate civil litigation involving trade secret
misappropriation. Witnesses in the civil action may refuse to
answer questions by asserting their Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination. 289
A private statutory cause of action would give the corporate
victims of attempted and completed trade secret misappropriation
standing in federal court to seek equitable and monetary damages. A
federal court will be able to order injunctive relief if it finds that:
288. This article addresses the single question of whether software vendors or other
intermediaries should be liable for negligence in the production or servicing of their software
and security-related services enabling trade secret theft.
Three theories of liability exist when software is implicated as a possible accident
cause: (1) strict liability, (2) breach of warranty, and (3) negligence. Strict
liability looks at a product itself and determines whether liability should be
assessed against a manufacturer by one who is not in privity with the
manufacturer. Warranty concerns the representations by the manufacturer as to a
product's capabilities. Negligence looks at the acts of the manufacturer and
determines if it exercised ordinary care in the design and production of the
product.
R.L. Mays, Patent No. 6,035,321- Opening the Door to Software Product Liability Exposure,
6 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FN. 197, 199 (2001).
289. Sorojini J. Biswas, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996,
http://www.myersbigel.com/tsarticles/tradesecret4.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
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(1) [A] moving party will suffer irreparable injury if the relief is
denied; (2) a moving party will probably prevail on the merits; (3)
the balance of potential harm favors a moving party; and (4) the
public interest favors granting relief. To obtain preliminary
injunctive relief in the alternative, a movant must demonstrate
either a likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of
irreparable injury, or that serious questions going to the merits
raised or the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor.290
Congress has already armed private citizens with federal causes
of action in nearly every conceivable regulatory regime from federal
environmental and consumer protection to the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act. "In the field of toxic
torts, the government relies on private litigants to enforce certain
environmental statutes. '291
A private civil action is already widely available under state
trade secret law since most states have adopted the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act. However, it will be more efficient to avoid parallel civil
proceedings in state courts. If the EEA was amended to include a
private cause of action, small or medium-sized companies might then
have the incentive to incur the expense of funding private
investigators to prove the theft or attempted or completed theft of
trade secrets. 292 The federal cause of action should incorporate the
robust remedies of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Victimized
companies would be able to underwrite the cost of tracking foreign
governments or agents conducting espionage with the proceeds from
uncapped tort awards. Private enforcement of the EEA would help
fulfill the public law enforcement gap in this area. By encouraging
plaintiffs to serve as private attorneys general, punitive damages
fulfill their most critical latent function as they vindicate the larger
societal interest by bridging the enforcement gap and increasing both
290. This is the standard for ordering injunctive relief under the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act. See, Pac. Aero. & Elecs. Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1198 (E.D. Wash.
2003).
291. Rustad, supra note 19, at 103. See also Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as
Prosecutor Model of Environmental Enforcement under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked
Problems of Outcome-Independent Value, 22 GA. L. REv. 337, 367 (1988) (noting that
Congress enlisted citizens to supplement the work of the Environmental Protection Agency).
292. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 454 (Wis. 1980) (discussing role of
private attorney general in punitive damages in products liability litigation setting).
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punishment and deterrence. 293  A private cause of action for
misappropriation may result in hundreds of millions of dollars in
punitive damages.294
The mobilization of private attorneys general to supplement
public enforcement is a proactive approach to identifying, locating,
and apprehending foreign and domestic industrial spies.295  The
private attorney general can also serve as a "powerful engine of
public policy" because of its responsiveness to social problems. 296
Private attorneys general use private enforcement to advance the
public interest in an efficient manner that is responsive to market
forces.297 Federal law enforcement resources are not adequate to
shoulder the complete load of punishing and deterring corporate
espionage. 298
F. Breach in Third Party Trade Secret Enablement Cases
Courts must first recognize that a software vendor, Internet
service provider, or other data handler owes a duty to protect the trade
secrets of the plaintiff. Some in the software industry already
recognize that software vendors and developers need to be
accountable, if not liable, for gross negligence in enabling security
threats. In the November issue of PC World magazine, Whitfield
Diffie, chief security officer of Sun Microsystems, is quoted as
saying, "Developers need to stop expecting users to police
293. David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV.
1257, 1287-88 (1976) (noting how the possibility of punitive damages creates greater incentives
for private lawsuits for a public purpose).
294. See, e.g., Mangren Research and Dev. Corp. v. Nat'l Chemical Co., 87 F.3d 937 (7th
Cir. 1996) (affirming a jury verdict awarding Mangren $252,684.69 in compensatory damages
and $505,369.38 in exemplary damages as well attorney's fees and costs in a trade secret
misappropriation lawsuit where malicious and willful misappropriation was proven).
295. Professors Brenner and Crescenzi point to the danger of relying upon "traditional
solutions in a non-traditional era; reacting to completed acts of economic espionage by
sanctioning the perpetrator(s) is an effective strategy only if they can be identified, located and
apprehended." Brenner & Crescenzi, supra note 100, at 3.
296. Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 179 (1998).
297. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
TORT LAW 160-61 (1987).
298. "As of 1996, at least twenty-four states had criminal statutes directed at the theft of
trade secrets .... Yet the states often lacked sufficient resources to pursue espionage
prosecutions." United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 195 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting James H. A.
Pooley et al., Understanding the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
177, 186 (1977)).
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themselves, and take responsibility for the users' safety. '299 The co-
creator of the Mozilla Firefox Internet browser makes a similar point:
The security community needs to provide information and
incentive to change behavior. This means education for users,
developers, and organizations doing business on the Internet;
attribution and penalties for criminal activities; and accountability
for unsafe software, unprotected systems, and insecure handling
of sensitive information. 300
Once a duty has been established, the particular standard of care
must be calibrated or set. In general, an Internet gatekeeper would
breach its standard of care if it created an unreasonable risk that trade
secrets would be intercepted. The statutory tort action would only
apply if a third party has failed to take reasonable precautions for
protecting trade secrets. 301
No reliable data exists on basic facts such as the number of
attacks by hackers or financial losses due to the misappropriation of
trade secrets. Similarly, not much data is available on the probability
of harm, severity of harm, or the cost of instituting precautions to
protect the integrity of online commercial transactions. Efficiency,
however, is the starting point for establishing what "ought to be done"
to eliminate known vulnerabilities that place the corporate crown
jewels at risk.
The World Wide Web, for instance, has morphed into an ideal
venue for the misappropriation of trade secrets because of defective
software, insufficient Internet security and other computer-based
vulnerabilities allowing data theft without a significant probability of
detection. Cybercriminals misappropriate trade secrets by
intercepting data by bypassing firewalls, altering e-mail headers, or
obtaining elevated privileges on computer networks by subterfuge.
The corporate victims of economic espionage and industrial
spying need a private cause of action giving them standing in federal
court to redress domestic and foreign trade secret theft. A second
reform would be to recognize an EEA cause of action for the
negligent enablement of trade secret theft. This secondary liability
299. Bruce Sterling, Is The Net Doomed?, PC WORLD, Nov. 2005, at 32, available at
http://www.pcworld.com/reviews/article/0,aid,122499,00.asp.
300. Id.
301. An online intermediary such as software vendor should be liable for negligence if it
fails to conform to industry standards of Internet security and its failure is the factual cause of
the plaintiffs injury.
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will incentivize the software industry to build better security into their
products and services. The recent Grokster case raises the parallel
question of whether computer software vendors, who create a product
that promotes illegal file swapping, should be liable for secondary
copyright infringement. Secondary tort liability should be imposed
on software publishers that facilitate economic espionage by
marketing products with known vulnerabilities. At present, the
victims of state-sponsored or corporate espionage have the tragic
choice of deciding whether to report trade secret theft to the FBI or to
file common law tort claims for misappropriation in state or federal
court.
3 0 2
CONCLUSION
The rapid pace of technological change has exposed a
fundamental weakness in the American civil justice system in our
federal trade secret law. United States' industry has become the
equivalent of a giant cookie jar by permitting foreign agents to steal
American know-how with a low probability of detection or
prosecution. In a decade of EEA prosecutions, no foreign
government has been charged with state-sponsored espionage. All
but a few EEA prosecutions were on behalf of Fortune 500
corporations or well-known institutions that can afford to conduct
thorough investigations. EEA should therefore be reformed to
formally recognize private causes of action.303 At present, the EEA
does not give private individuals or entities standing to file suit for
damages when they are victimized by industrial or economic
espionage.
302.
"Misappropriation" means acquiring a trade secret by "improper means" or from
someone who has acquired it through "improper means." Things like theft,
bribery, and misrepresentation are "improper means." Misappropriation also
includes disclosure and use of a trade secret acquired through "improper means."
If there is a misappropriation, the injured person may have injunctive relief and
damages. Injunctive relief may extend into the future, and may condition future
use on a proper royalty. Damages include actual loss and unjust enrichment.
Uniform Law Commissioners, Uniform Trade Secrets Act Summary,
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_summaries/uniformacts-s-tutsa.asp (last visited Apr.
6, 2006).
303. Unlike the EEA, a claimant may establish a civil cause of action under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, by demonstrating that a person has (i) "knowingly and
with intent to defraud," (ii) accessed a "protected computer," (iii) "without authorization," and
as a result (iv) has furthered the intended fraudulent conduct and obtained "anything of value."
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4) (2005).
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Secondary or indirect liability should extend to software
companies and other entities that enable trade secret theft. Expanded
federal trade secret protection will encourage greater investment in
research not covered by other criminal statutes. Federalizing the tort
of enabling industrial or economic espionage will require Congress to
amend the EEA to provide for a private cause of action. The key
question about third-party liability for trade secrets is whether
corporations, software vendors, and other critical Internet
infrastructure owners and operators owe a duty of care to implement
adequate security safeguards to prevent trade secret misappropriation.
A software vendor, Website, or Internet gatekeeper should be held
liable when it "facilitates" the realization of an independently created
risk by doing something that they knew or should have known would
"pave the way" for a third party to harm the victim. '304
Corporate and industrial espionage poses a great threat to U.S.
competitiveness in a global economy. Law enforcement has been
slow to punish and deter Internet-related espionage where a
company's trade secrets and other crown jewels can disappear with a
click of the mouse. 305 "Computer crimes cost U.S. businesses billions
of dollars every year. Many of these foreseeable economic losses
would have been prevented had companies taken even basic security
measures."
306
With cybercrimes skyrocketing and an ever-increasing amount
of sensitive information being exchanged on the Internet, fortified
federal tort remedies are a necessity. EEA must be amended to
304. Twerski & Sebok, supra note 191, at 1383. 1 use the term "Internet gatekeeper," to
refer to software developers, licensors, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), e-commerce websites,
Internet search engines, and other online intermediaries who protect critical Internet
infrastructure. This article proposes extending common law principles into cyberspace by
imposing a qualified duty of care on all Internet gatekeepers.
305. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs. Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231,
1256 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (ruling that trade secret status as to church documents was lost when
information was anonymously posted to the Internet). Cf DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v.
McLaughlin, No. CV 786804, 2000 WL 48512 at *3 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 16, 2000) (ruling that
trade secret status was not lost when misappropriators posted it to the Internet because "to hold
otherwise would do nothing less than encourage misappropriators of trade secrets to post the
fruits of their wrongdoing on the Internet as quickly as possible and as widely as possible
thereby destroying a trade secret forever.").
306. Former Justice Department CyberLawyer Peter Toren Authors Guide to Protection
Against High-Tech Theft and Intellectual Property Violations, BUSINESS WIRE, Sept. 12, 2003
(quoting Peter Toren).
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permit private actions for economic or industrial espionage. 307 This
means that the corporate victim of espionage will have a uniform
federal remedy against domestic and foreign spies. Startup
companies without the resources to launch private investigations of
trade secret theft will be armed as private attorneys general to
augment criminal enforcement.
Since 9/11, federal law enforcement officials have not made
economic or industrial espionage a priority. The government lacks
sufficient resources to tackle this type of crime without the help of
private attorneys general. Corporate espionage affects all Americans
because it has a corrosive impact on our tax base, destroys jobs, and
undermines our position in the global economy.
A robust regime of private enforcement is needed to supplement
the EEA. "Private enforcement in the form of 'E-cops' is already
becoming well established on the Internet, as many American high
technology companies are skeptical about the role of government in
detecting and punishing hackers. '308 The EEA needs to be reformed
to permit private causes of action to augment lax public enforcement.
The private attorney general is urgently needed to punish and deter
economic espionage and to protect American competitiveness.
307. See Boyd v. University of Illinois, No. 96 Civ. 9327(TPG), 1999 WL 782492
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that private citizens had no standing to file actions under Title I of the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 because it is a purely criminal statute).
308. Rustad, supra note 19, at 100.
